Radical Democracy and Methodology in post-Marxist Maruyama Masao

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Abstract:
Maruyama Masao (1914–1996) was a major political philosopher and democratic theorist of the 20th century in Japan. Main works of him were translated into English, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics (1963), Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan (1974) and so on. Maruyama stayed at UC Berkeley in 1976 and 1983 as a special visiting professor. And the Center for Japanese Studies (CJS) at UC Berkeley has opened Maruyama Masao Seminar after his coming. Though there have been a vast number of studies about Maruyama in Japan, we have to look into the methodology of his study on the history of political thought more deeply. Maruyama had built up his methodology under the influence of European Marxism, Hegelian and Neo-Kantian philosophy, Max Weber and Karl Mannheim. Both the study of political thought and the criticism of orthodox Marxism were done by his idea, radical democracy and post-Marxism, and his methodology. This paper clarifies five points of the study of history of thought in Maruyama. 1. Tension between liberalism and democracy, 2. Independent and internal logic of development, 3. Dynamism, acceptance and modification, 4. Multiple dimensions, 5. Various possibilities of thought.

Introduction

There is a school of the social scientists in Japan that has considered Japanese society and its capitalistic economy as exceptional or peculiar. Another traditional school has considered that Japanese society and its economy had universal features shared with the rest of the world. Social scientists in Japan seem to have been schizophrenic on this point. They fail to conceive of the relationship between peculiarity and universal in the methodology. In addition, sometimes social scientists in Japan have been torn up into theory and feeling of the reality.

Maruyama Masao who was a major political thinker and democratic theorist of the 20th century in Japan (Barshay 2004), had pointed out these methodological divisions in the social scientists in Japan. These problems are related to democracy, methodology of the so-
cial science and Marxism in Japan.

Then I would like to focus on three themes that appear in Maruyama’s works. This essay is made up of my research notes.

The first of the three themes is on radical democracy in Maruyama. The first point means his intellectual position in a wide sense. Democracy as permanent revolution is a key point in understanding his thought and methodology.

The second is his research methodology for the history of thought. This point refers to his viewpoint as a researcher of the political thought in Japan.

The last is Marxism. This third theme is one of the applications of the second theme for Maruyama. From the first point, radical democracy, Marxism relates to socialism and democracy for him. Maruyama had been influenced by Marxist thinking in Japan, but he had never been a Marxist. He was a strong critic of Stalinist Marxism. Because of his methodology, Marxism was one of his research themes, and it might be said that it was “the object of knowledge” (H. Rickert) for him.

Naturally, the three themes are connected to each other. What is the proper relation of politics to science in a democracy? Why did Maruyama, as a post-Marxist thinker, pronounce a permanent revolution for democracy? How did the Maruyama’s methodological standpoint apply to Marxism, although he had never been a Marxist. These questions must be very interesting.

Figure 1. Framework in this essay on Maruyama

(1) Democracy as permanent revolution

(2) Methodology of research of the history of thought in Japan

(3) Attitude for Marxism

1. Radical Democracy as Permanent Revolution

(1) Liberalism and Democracy

Maruyama was known as a modernist in the broader sense of that term. A modernist is someone who believes in Modernism, who likes modernity and promotes the modernization of society. Is it true that Maruyama was a modernist? What then is the meaning of “radical” and the spiritual aristocracy in Maruyama’s words? And how are modernism, modernity and modernization related together?

Modernization of Japanese society had been necessary for the newly ruling class after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. There was a dilemma here. The ruling class in Meiji society under the Tennou-sei (Japanese emperor system) had to introduce several modern technologies and institutions of western world, and to improve the productive power of society. The institutional changes involved the conversion of people’s minds. But, for the sake of unification of state and the concentration of power, the ruling class needed to restore the old authority of the Tennou and the hierarchical orders under the Japanese emperor. The
system gave people some measure of freedom, especially in terms of private ownership, but it strongly restricted the human rights of the people. The nation state in modern Japan had to be an authoritarian society by means of traditional discourse. Sovereignty resided nominally in the Emperor, Tennou, but actually in a small number of higher politicians, military groups and high-ranking officials. Including these groups, the Japanese people must be the subjects of Tennou. The nationalism in prewar Japan meant statism, antiforeign sentiment and chauvinism. And this system and thought had been widened to the colonial empire. But it included ambivalence.

The process of modernization in Japan had a fundamental contradiction between the authoritarian statism as a strong means of uniting of the nation (nation had never meant people, because Japanese nation was a subject of Tennou) and producing a strong capitalist economy as a social basis and modernity of the society.

Several works of Maruyama concentrate on analyzing the structure of mind in prewar Japan ("Ultra-nationalism"). In the literal sense of approving the modernization in general of Japanese society, Maruyama had never been a modernist. His thought had never been modernism. That is why he strongly rejected the peculiar modernization in prewar Japan. After the war he said that his enemy had been the mind structure of Tennou-sei.

After World War II, Maruyama wrote several papers about modern society in general. In 1947, the year in which Japanese society’s democratization was the most important problem for the US occupation and Japanese people, Maruyama said that "we have been confronting the subject of democratic revolution which had never been accomplished by the Meiji Restoration." ("Shu" vol.3, p.161) Furthermore it pressed people to confront with the problem of freedom again. He proceeded that those who would shoulder freedom were never the citizens whom liberal thinkers (after J.Locke) thought of, but they would be the many workers and small farmers in Japan. How were they able to acquire a new consciousness of ethics (in ibid.) For Maruyama, the important thing is the function of modern intellect and the mind of the people. The function of modern intellect comes down to understanding others as others and becoming other in and as oneself ("Gendai ni okeru Ningen to Seiji" 1961, in "Shu", vol.9, p.44, cf.Barshay 2004, p.242–243)

Modernism for Maruyama is best understood, therefore, as a reaction to the traditional discourse of community and ethos of family. He had never been a modernist, because he understood the risks of the modernizing of society. There are two phases in the formation of a modern society. First, modernization means the reification (becoming impersonal) of personal relationships. But, second, it means that people have to make their own social system, like an institution, an organization and rules. These consciously man-made things are fictions. There has to be an awareness that institutions and rules are man-made, not some kind of absolute, and people must always try to prevent a fiction from turning into an end of itself and to keep fictions relative. The contradiction of modern society exists in the process of individualization and substantialization of the organization in our society. When people would come to disbelieve the democratic formation of their organization, fascism would come to them. It was a myth of the 20th century. ("Nikutai-Bungaku kara Nikutai-Seiji
made” 1949, in “Shu” vol. 4, “From Carnal Literature to Carnal Politics”, in “Thought” ch. VIII.)

At that time, Maruyama considered all experiences and theories in prewar and wartime of the world. He was well aware that the ideologies of liberalism, democracy and socialism in the modernization of Japanese society involved traditional patterns, a way of thinking and a daily behavior of ordinary people. Since the pre-modern relations of people were powerful in Japan, these ideologies tended to have never been mediated with the real way of thinking and behavior of people. Modern ideology and traditional ways of thinking coexisted with each other. “This is the problem of limit in highly purposeful and selective modernization. … Modernization implies ambivalent possibilities in a cultural and political domain…” (“Patterns of Individuation”, in English version, 1965, p. 493, in “Shu” vol. 9, p. 382)

Then, for Maruyama, modernization implies ambivalent possibilities. Modernization creates liberal relationships among people, but it limited them on the other side. In the sense, “nationalism must be rationalized in the same degree that democracy is irrationalized.” (“Nationalism in Japan” 1951, in “Shu” vol. 5, p. 75) The quotation means that irrational nationalism must be denounced, and democracy must become usual way of thinking of people.

Furthermore, he noticed that liberalism in the modern world has never been a classical one. It is too naïve to believe that formal liberty does correspond to real liberty. Fascism which rejected people’s freedom had been brought from formal liberty. Russian Bolshevism made a theory of vanguard which meant that a part of social group must lead other people. And it is a dilemma that under the name of freedom the liberty is forced to people, and the way of life is uniform among people (especially in USA).

On the whole, Maruyama noticed the ambivalence of democracy. Liberalism and democracy have a tension between them. Though liberalism is the opposite of statism, elitist liberalism and oligarchy is the opposite of democracy. Democracy tends to produce the dictatorship of the majority which means oppression of people’s liberty. Then liberal democratic society always has such a tension for Maruyama.

(2) Dynamism of Being and Doing

For Maruyama, liberty and democracy are both dynamic processes. That is, being liberal is done by doing to be liberal. Democracy is essentially done by doing to be democratized, too. The most important thing is that the institutions of liberty and democracy must always be checked on and criticized by people. People must always be cautious of reification of the institutions (they take as their highest purpose themselves) and look out for their functions.

Maruyama said that the dynamism of modern spirit has been borne by giving relative priority to the logic or value of doing rather than the logic or value of being. It turns the realism of concepts to nominalism, and it screens and tests all dogmas. (“Nihon no Shiso”, p. 156–157, in “Shu” vol. 7, p. 25–26)

While being or to be is the relationships of the people, like as kinship, race and their so-
cial rank (Mibun), doing or to do is the role and play of the people. While the former is fixed, the latter is moving and it is divided several into parts according of the internal functions. The so-called functional groups — company, political party, union and association — are essentially made by the logic of doing and they characterize the modern society.

Maruyama’s idea that the being has changed into the doing seems to be the same as Max Weber’s. Weber expressed it as the transition from Gemeinschaft (the community) to Gesellschaft (the society). For M. Weber, the community was a native relationship of human being. And it had changed to the society in which people act and trade with each other. So the relationship had been separated to several sides. Those behaviors are evaluated by doing something each other. Being is functional in human culture, especially in modern era.

But Maruyama’s idea of being and doing and their changing patterns include a special meaning. The transition from being to doing was perversed in prewar society in Japan. The perversion meant that absolute being subsumed all other being and doings of people. That is, for Maruyama, the logic of being and doing was a strong criterion for evaluating historical matters. Being refers to situation or state of affairs, such as family’s social standing (Ie-gara) and their assets (Shisan). In Japan, the traditional situation had become deeply rooted, to be more precise, the situation had been re-established after the Meiji Restoration. So that doing of people was separated each other. Though the logic of doing is originally a functional difference, under which the logic of being is strongly subsumed, people could not understand the mutual meanings of their doings, they could only do with each other in a small and narrow world. He named this phenomenon the octopus pot (“Ta-kotsubo”) society. Where the voluntary formation of multiple groups and the autonomous communication of people has been limited, the social base of discussion and meeting has never matured.

I guess Maruyama may say that cultural values must be judged by themselves (being), while political and economic values must be judged by these functions (doing). In Japan, however, the value of doings used to be judged by being (not functional), the value of being used to be judged by the functional matters. He pointed it was “perversion”. And he raised the question by himself whether the conversion of politics into culture means the conservative position of him or not, he answered it and ended his assertion as following: “The most necessary thing in the intellectual world of modern Japan is that radical intellectual aristocracy should be linked interiorly with a radical democracy” (“Nihon no Shi-sou” 1959, p. 179, in “Shu” vol. 8, p. 44).

Insofar as democracy is an intellectual and spiritual concern, for Maruyama, it is a vital “fictions”. Without the efforts of people, democracy would remain a fictitious matter, and the reality (situation or being) of society would become an ideological affirmation of the established order, and it would kill democracy in its own name.

So the word “radical” means a permanent movement (“doings”). His aristocratism does not mean aristocrat. The bearer of aristocratism is not only intellectuals. The broad working masses including workers and farmers at the core carry the democratic thought for
their own sake and by themselves as their own spirits.

(3) Socialism

Now, I have to talk about what socialism meant for Maruyama. Though he wrote about Marxism as I will discuss later, he never talked much about socialism. From the viewpoint of Marxism, socialism was the opposite of capitalism. If capitalism was one of scientific words which specifies the economic basis of modern civil society, socialism must be a movement and form of thought that would overcome the capitalist system of society. To be sure socialism could be connected with statism and oligarchy, and it then tended to produce dictatorship in society. But in its own sense socialism is a negation of the capitalist economy. Socialism as a negation of capitalism can be bound with liberalism and democracy as an ideal thought and permanent movement.

For Maruyama, the relation between democracy and socialism was a pressing issue. The issue is how the masses acquire a new normative consciousness of the tension between freedom, liberty and democracy. If liberalism and democracy would become a permanent revolution, its goal would be the associated society for Maruyama. He said that "socialism is a road to enlarge democratization to the inside of production relationship" (1957, in “Shu” vol.6, p.356), and from its meaning democracy is newer than any socialism (1964, in “Shu” vol.9, p.174). In my opinion, the associated society including individuation and democratization in the individuation is not only any idea of socialist society, but also near of to the idea of Marx.

Maruyama discussed with many thinkers. At a three-man talk in 1966, Maruyama said, “Saying sweepingly, the democratic institutions have come to strain the bourgeois system of rule. … At that time, the opposite of fascism, the principles of democratic institutions which have developed in the womb of bourgeois society would be exerted to the production relationship and the management form. This is socialism.” (“Zadan” vol.6, p.156.)

At a meeting in 1965, Maruyama stated that "in the history of thought, socialism was born when democracy tried to break its limitation within capitalism, and socialism necessarily relates to democracy, but it could not be said that political democracy would be born on the basis of socialism. If we can think there is a different level between socialism and democracy, the connection of socialism and democracy is best." (“Zadan” vol.5, p.135.)

When I close this first section, I would like to introduce another famous phrase of Maruyama: “As for my own choice in the matter: Rather than opt for the ‘reality’ of the empire of Japan, I’ll put my money on the ‘sham’ of postwar democracy.” (“Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo”, 1964, p.585, in “Shu” vol.9, p.184)

![Figure2: Three cores of Maruyama's thought](image)

- Democracy (vs. Oligarchy)
- Liberalism (vs. Statism)
- Socialism (vs. Capitalism)

*The words in each parenthesis mean the opposite things of three cores.
2. The Method of Research of the History of Thought in Japan—five points

Maruyama specialized in the history of political and social thought. His object of study had been several forms of thoughts and their history, especially in Japan. Though he talked and wrote about his method, his research attitude was that of “jumping into the water”. He had never written about the principles for the study of history of thought. It is therefore difficult for us to understand his research methodology for the history of thought. And he said research methodology for the history of thought must be pluralistic.

But I might say that there are five points of Maruyama’s methodology.

First, while he might seem to control his passions and desires concerning his sense of value, he was fully aware of his standpoint. It was the tension between liberalism and democracy as I mentioned above. In his research of the history of thought the tension between liberalism and democracy set the basic tone. A typical example of this was the historical study of Japanese political thought. He extracted the tendency toward liberal thought in typical and traditional feudalism of Japan. And he studied the turning from exclusionism to the notion of an equal relationship among nation states. The formation of modern intellect in the process of modernization in Japan is the first point of his research methodology. This point had never changed.

The second point is that he studied the development of the independent and internal logic of thought. For example, he wrote that the question was how to turn from exclusionism to a modern notion of an equal relationship of nation states within established theory. In this sense thought develops an original position independently of the social structure, but it is not unrelated to the structure. The development of thought is not simple and has several possibilities, for Maruyama.

The categories of thinking refer to the given condition when man thinks about concrete things. Human thinking and doing have their original and historical conditions. These are not only our social environment, but also include the subject (human brain) as the patterns of thinking that have been accumulated in the history.

Then, for Maruyama, ideas and thoughts are not a reflection of the economic basis of society. The problem is to understand the autonomic and internal movement of thought and to try to understand it positively as a moment of change in the whole system of society as a concrete universal. For Maruyama, there does not exist a relation between economic basis and its superstructure in terms of a one-to-one meaning. Using this methodology Maruyama was able to write his famous essay, “Theory and Psychology of Ultra-nationalism” (1946, in “Shu” vol. 3). He described the main ideological factors and attempted any fundamental analysis of its intellectual structure. He grasped two main principles of “transfer of oppression” and “stunted-ness of power” (irresponsibility of power) in it. Thus he explained the origins and features of an ideology and a way of thinking.

At the same time, Maruyama emphasized that the history of thought is to be understood
in the context of social history, and the inner structure of consciousness and the principles of the subject of thought can not be understood without the relationship between the subject and the historical process of society. In short, Maruyama found the key of setting the historical context of thought in social history and the peculiar forms of mental development. Through setting the mediator, the idea of conditioned thought model, the idea of perspectives, between ideas and social basis, he could point out the so-called restriction of knowledge by social existence (Karl Mannheim, 1893–1947). He tried to grasp the dynamism of thought.

He wrote that it is a primary theme and the origin of interestingness of research of the history of thought to reproduce a past thought through so-called dialectic tension that exists between the restriction of oneself by history and the reconstruction of a historical object by oneself. (1961, “Shu” vol.9, p.72)

The third point concerns the dynamism, acceptance and modification of thought. When Maruyama considered the modernization of Japanese society, he noticed the close connection between the lengthways historical change, from traditional to modern, and the crosswise contact between the West (including China and Korea) and Japan. The problem is how to understand the acceptance and modification of thought itself. Maruyama introduced to the history of thought perspective, cultural change and cultural contact between different countries. He noted, “the introduction to intellectual history of this perspective … which includes the problem of translating words, necessarily involves the rejection of universalistic theories of historical stages of development.” (1978, “Shu” vol.10, p.343, Cf. Barshay 2004, p.234)

He wrote about the tradition of thought and making use of it. Abstract theories and world views came to Japan from foreign countries. Although it is important to research their changes from the original when they entered Japan, if we use only the yardstick of deviation and degeneration, we will end up with a history of Japanese thought that is a history of total distortion and error. Several forms of thought were imported with a highly developed awareness. In the very process, the people or thinkers approached the problems of their day in their own subjective way. (Cf. 1961, “Shisō-shi no Kangaé-kata ni tsuite” in “Shu” vol. 9. “An Approach to the History of Thought.” in Asian Cultural Studies 5, p.14–15.)

The fourth point, therefore, is the problem of thought having multiple dimensions. The dynamism of thought that Maruyama intended to grasp was the relationship between an awareness of the issues facing the times, inner reformation of thought and its influence on real lives.

The way of thinking and its categories are restricted by the patterns of tradition in a nation and its historical period, and they exist under given conditions as the lower level of our consciousness and semi-consciousness. Then Maruyama clarified that thought has multiple dimensions. Historical and social conditions, as mentioned above, entered into the subjects as the several patterns of thinking.

There are five levels of ideal forms. (1) The so-called “stratosphere”, the most abstract
and systematized theories and doctrines, (2) more comprehensive views and images of the world and life, (3) the levels of particular opinions and attitudes, (4) the feelings, moods and sentiments about life, (5) under-conscious awareness. (Cf. “Shu” vol. 9, p. 64)

Maruyama emphasized various dimensions of archaic Japanese consciousness in his later years. The words “prototype” “ancient substrate” and “the basso ostinato” mean what operates in it. Its effect was not to prevent change but to pattern it. In Maruyama, spiritual change in Japanese is apprehended in terms of an élan of succession without end, tsugitsugi to nariyuku ikioi in Japanese. (Cf. Barshay 2004, p. 246) He had never changed his point of view and his methodology. On the contrary, this study was a result of his research.

The fifth, final point. Maruyama aimed at various possibilities of thought, derived from four points mentioned above.

He said that there was a stronger inertia in thoughts and ideas than in the institutions and organization of society. New ideas and forms of thought sometimes must be dressed in old clothes in order to smoothly enter the inside of people’s consciousness. Thought has its own origins and characteristics. This means that thought has its own original forms of development. A type of thought has to be understood in terms of its ambivalence at the starting point. We need to concentrate on the various factors and possibilities of a thought which are able to develop in any direction. (1961, “Shu” vol. 9, p. 77)

In terms of the autonomy, dynamism and multi-dimensionality of thoughts, the last point is a natural result. But, the various possibilities of thought do not mean there are no contradictions, ambivalences and conflicts among them.

Maruyama researched and wrote his works by using these five points of view. Naturally, according to the concrete theme he was treating at any given time, he used one of these points in particular.

As mentioned above, for Maruyama, the function of modern intellect comes down to understanding others as others and to become others in and as oneself. (1961, “Shu” vol. 9, p. 44, cf. Barshay 2004, p. 242–243)

In my own view, this phrase is related to Hegel’s dialectic of Self and Others. In Hegel’s logic the dialectic meaning of relation has three dimensions. In the first dimension, something (Self) converts into others. It is alteration. In the second dimension, something opposes itself to others. It is an essential relationship. In the third dimension, something becomes others, which are not in fact others, it is in itself. Then a particular thing does not remain as itself. While it opposes itself to another particular thing, it becomes not only the other particular, but also it penetrates the others. In that sense, something or a peculiar thing has to be called universality, and particularity equals universality at the same time. The dialogue seems to be mysterious, it is true, but it is not only the way of understanding an organic body, like a society, but also the way of development of things for Hegel. And it is an important point that something has its own contradiction within itself.

Maruyama used to use the words of ambivalence, contradiction, dilemma and tension. What do these words mean? They say that thought has no contradiction in logic and
sense. But, for Maruyama, the function of modern intellect has its own multiple conflicts.

Furthermore, modern intellect had been introduced (imported) to Japan in the process of the modernization of society. So political and social thought in modern Japan have had three dimensions. One is what Maruyama named deep things of consciousness, second are the modernist minds, and third are several anti-modern thoughts.

Maruyama focused on the process of the modernization of consciousness. The most important thing for Maruyama is how consciousness of independent and free persons as the bearers of democracy had been made up in the process of modernization of Japanese society. This way is called the internal development of thought. The process necessarily involves several tensions, contradictions and ambivalences.

When Maruyama considered the process of development of consciousness, he never remained neutral. Because from his viewpoint, democracy as permanent revolution, it was important that how the modern intellect had been begun to bud, what is an obstacle of it, and to what the modern thought and mind had opposed. Sometimes the thought of a person has two sites. A sort of social thought too.

In connection to the ambivalence, contradictions of thoughts, I have to raise a question of the split into universal and particular. The ambivalence between universal and particular is one of the contradictions of thought. What are universal and particular in terms of thought?

If a kind of thought would assert its universality, all of another thought is particular. Maruyama wrote that the identification of the “universal” with what is “external” to Japan tends to become a sort of particularism in itself. As its reaction the emphasizing the inside appears (“Uchi” in Japanese). It means nativism which would be opposed to universalism (1977, “Shu” vol. 10, p. 264–265, cf. Barshay 2004, p. 234). It had appeared in prewar social science that the challenge of Japanese empire against the Western world was the conflict of particularism versus universalism.

For Maruyama, the universal does not exist in the external area or any model-country. Universal is the feeling and logic in which all of persons, cultures and nations have to be seen as same. Universal could be realized to be particular by its own mediation. The particular has to be mediated by the universal, though Maruyama denied the existence of universal. For him it seems that all things are individual and particular.

3. Marxism as an Object of Research of the History of Thought

What was Marxism for Maruyama, especially in terms of his thought, democracy as permanent revolution, and in terms of the methodology of the history of thought in Japan? As mentioned above, Marxism, as one of the forms of thought imported from abroad into Japan, had to be an object of research from the standpoint of the sociology of knowledge for Maruyama. Though he had been strongly influenced by prewar Marxism, especially during his younger period, he could remain a non-Marxist.
Maruyama’s reference to the “interesting ambivalence” (1983, “Shu” vol. 10, p. 85) in Japanese Marxism can be applied to the ambivalent relationship between him and Marxism too. What is the meaning of ambivalence in this case?

(1) The role of Marxism in prewar Japan

In one of Maruyama’s most famous works, the negation of the Tennou-sei as ideology, he taught that Tennou-sei as ideology had been one of his enemies in his own life. It is important to note that Tennou-sei ideology had a material power at the mass level. The problem was that it could have produced the mobilization, or rationalization, of the “irrational” primary attachment to family in the service of the state.” (Barshay 2004, p. 217) Marxists could not understand how Tennou-sei could “have taken hold of the Japanese people’s mode of behavior, way of life, and forms of thinking.” (ibid.) Although Karl Marx wrote that if a theory could have taken hold of the mass it has become a material power, Marxism had never come to be so in Japan.

We can understand the meaning of Marxism in the Japanese history of thought in Maruyama’s “Nihon no Shiso” (1961).

First, “Marxist philosophy and the interpretation of history held not only that … economy, law and politics were ineluctably linked, but that even the fields of literature and art had to be seen not in isolation but as linked mutually with them. By pointing out the common foundation from which the various aspects of the “superstructure” arise, Marxism may fairly be deemed the first world view (Weltanschauung in German) in modern Japan which compelled one intellectually to explicate the transformation of social systems in a total and coherent fashion.” (Barshay 2004, p. 202). “Marxism was a grand theory of modern idealism, which bore the name of materialism”, Maruyama said that its “methodology presented a startling freshness of vision as an integrating, systematic science” (1973, “Shu” vol. 12, p. 85–86) to Japanese who were mired in a precociously overspecialized academia.

Second, Maruyama recognized that Marxism as communism includes the universal values of humanism and democracy. (Cf., 1959, “Shu”vol. 8, p. 33) Marxism clarified the inseparable relationship between scholarship and thought. When scientists select something as valuable, they use their mental abilities. For Maruyama the most important notion was that true radicalism and its essence has the idea of humanity as human beings being the free creator of society which means that they have the ability to control themselves and their society just as they hope. (Cf., 1959, “Shu” vol. 8, p. 157) From these words he noticed one aspect of Marxism, the idea of human development.

(2) Criticism — Faith in Theory (Riron-Shinkou)

Maruyama argued that even though Marxism had good points, it also, on the other hand, or precisely for that reason, produced some points that needed to be criticized in Japan.

One of these is the faith in theory. It means fetishism of theory and thought. The fetishism of theory corresponds to the fetishism of institutions in society. Though the essence of modern spirit is to create the institutions of society, the institutions in Japan were ready-
made articles from the western world. Thus their spirit tended to be neglected. As a result, sometimes theory and concept are confused with reality.

The theory and duty of the theorist exist in dividing and putting in order the complicated and various realities from a particular value standard, for Maruyama. The ordered knowledge can not only wrap whole realities in itself, but also substitute for the realities. If someone would think that his theoretical position essentially could grasp whole realities, there would be no limitation of possibility for reality, and from that, on the contrary, theoretical irresponsibility for its own theory would appear.

If scholars were to place absolute trust in the theory, so-called fetishism of theory, it would be unavoidable either there would happen a self-consolation of revolution in social science, that is a mere revolution in the academic world, or the interpretation of the sacred books (for example, Marx's "Capital"). (Cf. "Shu" vol. 7, p. 241)

(3) Universal and Particular

Thus a split between theory and reality had been developing. The autonomy, dynamism, multi-dimensions and multiple possibilities of thought had disappeared in Japanese Marxism. And that's not all; as a consequence, Japanese Marxism had divided into a kind of particularism and universalism.

A Marxist thinker who identifies universal with what is external to Japan, for example with the western world or any model-country, tends to emphasize the particularity of Japanese society. They consider Japan as a society alienated from the universal. On the contrary, some thinkers considered Japan as a mere representation of the universal, for example of monopoly capitalism or something of that sort. They would stand on the perspective of universalism. But they can not understand the phenomenological forms of the universal in Japan. So the way of appearance of universal is any particularity. Universal arises amid historical particularity and also transcend any particularity.

Maruyama was a thinker broadly in the Japanese Marxian tradition, the Koza-ha (Lectures Faction) line. He holds the particularist perspective of the Koza-ha. But he held a stubborn perspective of universalism by stressing the common formation of free and independent persons in modern history. Then he could understand the conditions and limitations of thoughts in the formation of persons in a history of Japan. As Maruyama was an outstanding dialectician, he could understand the mediation of the universal and particular.

(4) Theory and Reality

Maruyama pointed out that there was a confusion of theory and reality in Marxism.

Because of fetishism of theory or a faith in theory, Marxism had never understood the reality of politics and society and it had never overcome a faith in actual feeling. From that points formulism and schematism had appeared in their way of thinking. As a result they neglected the irrational factor in the way of thinking and doing in real politics. Maruyama thought that they left an irrational action because of reductionism in theory. The closed system and perfectionism of theory sometimes produced terrorism or inhuman
action in real politics. It is a practical translation of its theory to real politics. We can find an example in real politics of history in communist countries and Jacobin democracy as its origin.

For Maruyama, political process is an accumulation of innumerable determinations. That is the second reason why an irrational moment enters in political process. There is a tension between an individual determination and a knowledge of law in society. An individual and personal determination can not be reduced to the universal. If we reduced, a sense of responsibility in politics would be deducted. There is a different between rationalism and pragmatism in the view of science for Maruyama.

(5) Anti-Stalinist Way of Thinking

An essay “A Critique of De-Stalinization” (1956) was one of famous essays of Maruyama. (Cf., “Shu” vol. 6, “Thought”, pp. 177-224).

Maruyama wrote in the essay that the consistent awareness of issue was to criticize De-Stalinization “from the point of method of knowledge in politics”. That means he tried to clarify the principal problems of Marx-Leninism, especially the so-called liberalization of thought. It stands to reason that he considered the problem from the standpoint of his methodology as has been mentioned in the second section of this paper. The conclusion of Maruyama’s essay was that the truth and historical meaning of Marxism would be in a position suitable for it on a stage of history of thought only by shaking off the dictatorship and compulsion of truth.

This problem exists in the epistemology of politics. Furthermore it must be considered under the common basis shared by Marxists and non-Marxists for extracting the common issue and political learning of a lesson. Then we have to notice the title of his essay. The essay did not try to criticize so-called Stalinism or Stalinist system, but to criticize a way of thinking in anti-Stalinist Marxism. Maruyama wrote that the essay would not criticize the principles of Marxism and the system of the Soviet Union and the people’s democracy, but it could separate out a way of thinking which seemed to exist among communists.

The Stalinist and other Marxists tend to consider the system of theory and party spirit as closed and perfect. Then they tend to put the minds and political means limited by the particular conditions in their world view, and tend to rationalize all of them by the necessity of political conflicts. Their disposition not only obstructed communication with other positions in scholarship, but also confronted the difficulties of self-control of political means. Maruyama, therefore, required them to separate out the peculiar logic of politics from their world view.

There was a way of thinking, the so-called base-reductionism in Marxism. Because of it Marxists rejected the effort of understanding the personalities of humanity, the way of human actions and their interaction. So they sometimes explained the reasons of concrete behavior of people in tremendously naïve and impractical ways. By a Marxist way of thinking, that is the manifestation of the essence, all things are tangible of an inborn and inherent one, they are explained by the logic of development of an organic body, and
moreover the logic of norms is a way of thinking about natural law. But, for Maruyama, by a dialectic way of thinking, the subject (Uchi) is changed by an external (Soto) shock, and the outside itself is changed by the movement and action of the inside.

By a reductionist way of thinking on history, thoughts are explained in one dimension, and they develop through a single line. The things that exist multi-dimensionally and are mutually determined are arranged by the stages of history that are founded upon the essence. So, an ideology in the following stage essentially absorbs and has passed through a previous one. For example, socialism as a form of thought passed through liberalism and democracy.

In short, Marxist way of thinking had tended to neglect or reject dynamism, multi-dimensionality, and the various possibilities of thoughts, including itself, which has been mentioned above in the second section of this paper.

Maruyama wrote that if the occurrence of the Stalin era is expressed in a tragedy it would lead us to a moral sentimentalism on the one side and to Machiavellianism in a popular sense on the other side.

(6) Hegel and Marx in Maruyama

Maruyama said many times that he had studied G. W. Hegel and he was influenced by Hegel’s philosophy, especially the reason of history, in his youth just as he was by Marxism. Maruyama explained the reason why he did not become a Marxist. First, his father was a journalist who was involved in factual details and did not believe in any grand theory. Second, Maruyama had studied neo-Kantian thought and empirical rationalism as well as Hegelian philosophy. He was unable to accept any social science founded upon a reflectionist epistemology. Maruyama had believed in the power of ideas, progressiveness and reason in human history derived from Hegel. Then he sympathized with Marxism. But, in my viewpoint, one of the reasons why he never went down the road toward Marxism, is that he could not find the rational foundation of dialectic.

In Hegel’s philosophy the truth of fact and the idea of practice are identified. Hegel thought he could grasp the whole of history in his encyclopedia (system of philosophy), and the absolute idea is the creator of whole of the world in Hegel’s philosophy. Marx criticized this conversion in Hegel’s system of philosophy. Marx could write his “Capital” and drafts for it based on his rational dialectic. Marx destroyed the fetishism of the typical system and construction of concepts in Hegel’s philosophy.

Maruyama criticized the thought of Hegelian Marxism in which “an analogous conflation (of fact and value) took place” (Barshay 2004, p. 208). In my view, Marxist remnants were responsible for the conflation of fact and value, theory and reality. Though Maruyama talked about Marxism, he had never written about the original texts of Marx. After Marx’s death, his successors had divided into Hegelian Marxists and positivist Marxists. As Maruyama wrote, Marxism (Marx’s stand too) is a materialism which dialectically does lift (“aufheben” in German) the antagonism between rational and positive, and it is a world view which practically (not in meditation) identify the thought of natural law with the
thought of romantic. (Cl. "Shu" vol. 8, p. 123)

But finally from the standpoint of methodology, I have to point out that there is one great difference between Hegel-Marx and Maruyama. This is the difference between the substantialist view of concepts in Hegel-Marx and the nominalist idea in Maruyama. (Cl. "Shu" vol. 12, p. 46-47.)

Maruyama thought that modern spirit turned the substantialist view of concepts to nominalist view. (Cl. "Shu" vol. 8, p. 12) Surely, in the Middle Ages substantialist view of the universal was connected with the proof of existence of God, and modern empiricism was connected to the nominalism. But in the nominalist view, the universal does not exist, just only the individual and separate things exist. The universal is a mere means for explaining of phenomena. It exists in recognizing subject (person). It is understandable that Maruyama took a position of nominalism because he stood on modern intellect which doubts all of existence. But, as mentioned above, he understood a contradiction or ambivalence between the universal and the particular of things and thoughts. If the universal does not exist, he could not say so. In this final point, there exists a self-contradictory thought in Maruyama.

For Hegel and Marx both the individual and the universal exist, and the particular exists too as a mediator between individual and universal. The universal exists as one of particulars, especially as Marx clarified. Hegel and Marx thought the concepts are realistic. This is a negation of negation in the history of philosophical thought. Hegel overturned the philosophical standpoint again.

Conclusion

As a political thinker and democratic theorist, Maruyama concretized methodology of the history of thought by asserting pluralism in method. Though he had been influenced by German idealism, I. Kant, G. W. Hegel and Neo-Kantian, K. Marx, M. Weber, and western positivism, he had a unified personality as a researcher. So it is necessary for us to understand Maruyama's several methodological resources. But he imagined democracy as a permanent revolution in postwar Japan. He carried through his idea, and at the same time from his standpoint he pointed out the limits of modern liberalism and socialism. Though he could hardly be called a Marxist, and criticized the lack of methodology in Marxism, he had always declared openly that he had been influenced by Marx and he participated in discussion with many Marxists. In this sense, from his ideas and methodology, we can say that he should be called a post-Marxist and Maruyama's works must be considered as an intellectual heritage of Japan.

Footnotes:
1) Maruyama Masao (1914–1996) is a great historian and political scientist in Japan.
2) I would like to introduce English quotations from Maruyama that will be helpful for this pa-
per. The "vol." means the number of volume in "Maruyama Masao Shu" (1996).

1) "What is seriously short of, and most needful for the intellectual world in modern Japan is radical intellectual aristocratism linked interiorly with radical democracy" isn’t it. (from Barshay 2004, p.226) in "Shu", vol. 8, p. 44.

「現代日本の知的世界に実在に欠けし、もっとも要求されることは、ラディカル（根底的）な精神的貴族主義がラディカルな民主主義と内面的に結びつくことではないか」（『である』ことと『する』こと）1959年、『日本の思想』1961年、p.179)


「思想史というのは領域においてマルクス主義の方法があたえた衝撃は、日本ではきわめて興味深い両義性（ambivalence）を示した」（日本政治思想史研究 英語版への序文、1983年）

3) “Anyone who has directly passed through Marxism, even if they became post-Marxian, could not ignore Marx. It is the same as in the field of research called history of thought.”, in "Shu", vol. 10, p. 344.

「まともにマルクス主義をかいくぐった者は、マルクス以後派（post-marxist）ではあっても、マルクス無視派にはなれません。それは思想史という学問領域でも同じことです。」（思想史の方法を模索して）1978年)

4) There have been a vast number of studies about Maruyama in Japan. This paper is not one of these studies about Maruyama, and is based only upon my limited notes. It is just a note of learning from Maruyama for the author who has specialized in comparative study of methodology between G. Hegel, K. Marx, C. Menger, G. Schmoller and M. Weber. See. Kakuta (2008a, b).

5) Sociology, for Weber, is a way of understanding human actions by their cultural mind.

6) He wrote about "civil society", mass society and the dilemma of "civil society". But Maruyama said, "I never call those people who are alienated from monopoly (capital) citizen. There is no substance of citizenship." "Gendai ni okeru Kakumei no Ronri", with Sato Noboru, 1961, "Zadan" vol.4, p.148.

7) In the English edition of "Thought," the word “production relationship” (Marxist word) was translated to “industrial organization” (modernist word). ("Thought", p.286)

8) Tosaka Jun who was a famous philosopher in Japanese Marxism and died in prison for an ideological offence, said that Marxism had never spread among the masses like “Okesa-bushi”, a traditional folk form of music and dancing in Japan.


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References:

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ここではあらためて、パーシェイ教授をはじめ、パーシェイ教授を筆者に紹介してくださった後藤康夫さんと後藤官代さん、ならびに関係の方々に厚くお礼を申し上げたい。
本稿の公刊にあたり、立命館大学「研究成果の国際的発信強化」の支援を得た。また、本研究成果の一部は基礎経済科学研究所2009年春季研究集会（於：阪南大学）で報告の機会を得て、同研究所機関誌『経済科学通信』（第120号，2009年9月，40-46ページ）に掲載されたことを付記する。