MEMOIR

Direct Foreign Investment as a New Push Factor of Emigration[1]

——The Case of the United States of America and Japan——

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1. INTRODUCTION

The United States is by far the world's leading country of international immigration. Each year during the 1980s an average of six hundred thousand immigrants from all over the world were legally admitted into the country. In short, more than 50 million people have immigrated since independence in 1776. As President John F. Kennedy once wrote (1964), the United States is "a nation of immigrants." Meanwhile, Japan, from the mid-1980s has become entangled in the realities of a whirlpool of numerous international migrants flowing in from developing Asian countries.[2] The number of registered foreigners exceeded a million and was recorded at 1,075,000 in 1991 and hit around 1,281,644 at the end of 1992.

International migration has changed considerably in character during the last two decades, a departure from the early history of international migration. The old migration moved from North to South (European migrants) and from South to more southern directions (Asian migrants), while today's flow is moving from

South to North. In the case of immigration into the United States, unlike the earlier, today's immigrants are drawn not from Europe but over whelmingly from the developing nations of the Third World, especially from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. Immigration into Japan also has the same situation. The harsh fact is that this emigration decision is made at a time when immigration opportunities (in the United States and Japan) are "at best stagnant and at worst declining." (W. R. Böhning, 1991).

Direct foreign investment is one way of international measures in trying to help countries of emigrants to self-realisation in convincing their people that it is no longer necessary to emigrate. It is worth noting here that both countries, the United States and Japan, have been the main suppliers of foreign investment to these immigrants countries. However, direct foreign investment activities in these countries, indirectly, had resulted in the formation of a vast supply of emigrant workers. This new development shows that the traditional "push-pull" factors traditionally used to explain emigration are now obsolete and insufficient to explain new pattern of international migration. A "new" push factor should be introduced to explain the current international migration, since the former do not promote large-scale emigration.[3)]

The aim of this paper is to analyze the flow of direct foreign investment as a new push emigration factor and to identify how it is associated with migration, and then to apply it more specifically to the Latin American and Asian migrations[4)] into the United States and Japan.

For the United States, focus will be given from the period beginning in the middle of the 1960s, since this is the starting period of massive new migrations especially from Latin America, the Caribbean Basin and Asia. Almost all immigrants from Latin America are Mexican, Puerto Rican, Dominican and Haitian (Hispanics), while Chinese, Indian, Filipino, Korean and Japanese are the main sources from Asia. On Japan, focus will be given from the 1980s because it is just a recent phenomenon and became evident only in the mid 1980s. Most of the migrants came from Asian countries (South Korean, Malaysian, Thais, Filipinos, and Chinese) and South America (Brazilians and Peruvians). Migrants from the Middle East, especially the Iranians also contributed to a significant number of migrants into the United States and Japan.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.

2. 1 Basic definition of migration.

Migration, basically, occurs when an individual changes his residence and employment from the territory of the country to that of another, regardless of the nationality of the individual concerned. This definition covers both permanent and temporary migrations, as well as return migrations to the country of origin. Why does an individual leave his country of residence to settle and to take up employment in another country for a period of time? For a long time there has been a tendency to see migration as basically resulting from the weighing of various economic factors and the decision to move as being triggered by priority in the "push-pull" of economics.[5] Economic motivation for migration arises when the level of economic development varies between countries. More specifically, we can identify push factors in emigration countries and pull factors in immigration countries. Under this view, migration usually takes place when an individual realizes the advantages of emigration and decided to move rather than to stay, on the basis of the "push" and the "pull" factors. A 'push' factor emerged when a move may have to be considered after the needs can no longer be satisfied in the home country, for example, over population (or abundant labor), poverty, lack of job prospects, or a stagnant economy. On the contrary, an individual might be satisfied with the present situation but the availability of new information which include the the prospect of higher pay and labor scarcity in the destination country might be the deciding factor for move for better opportunities. This could be termed as the 'pull' factor. Generally speaking, people tend to move from low-income areas to high-income areas, from stagnant areas to rapidly expanding areas and from areas of poor or intermittent employment opportunities to areas where employment is more certain or guaranteed by contract.[6] The massive European international migration observed in the nineteenth century was a combination of these "push" and "pull" factors.

2. 2 Rationality in migration.

Currently accepted approaches to the cause of migration focus on the rationality

of individual migrants. People move to find jobs, or to find better jobs. They make a rational calculation of their interest in staying as opposed to leaving. When the balance tips toward leaving, they go (Petersen, 1977). This approach is stated in different ways by different authors.

According to Roseman, "If a high comparative place utility is put upon the present job of the household head, and upon the climate and other local environmental conditions, then the household is likely to remain ... If the household puts a higher comparative place utility upon environmental conditions, a better job, or hope for a better job, in another general area, it may decide to move." (Roseman, 1971)

Schwartz (1971) states simply, "we expect people to migrate from low earning locations into high earning locations". He sees human migration as a deliberate act, wherein the migrant attempts to increase his "lifetime utility".

For Eichenbaum (1975), who constructs a "matrix of human movement" migrants are precisely those people who are free to make a calculation about both place of origin and of destination. People who are absolutely constrained by their environment at the place of origin are either refugees or slaves, not migrants at all.

Lee's (1966) well-known theory of migration asserts that there are four factors associated with migration: (see Figure 1)

1) Factors associated with place of origin.
2) Factors associated with place of destination.
3) Intervening obstacles.
4) Personal factors.

Figure 1 Origin and destination factors and intervening obstacles in migration



Factors at origin and destination

\+ attracting 0 neutral − repulsing

Source : Everett S. Lee, 1966.

This theory explains how in every place there are countless factors which act to hold people or attract new people (pull), and other factors which tend to repel them (push), and that intervening obstacles, like distance tend to discourage migration. In this theory migrants make a rational calculation, but it must be overwhelmingly in favor of leaving for migration to occur as there is a certain amount of inertia which must be overcome.

This "rational actor" approach underlies even the Wallersteinian analysis of the world labor market by Petras (1981). Her argument is that workers seek the best wages and standard of living. "By migrating to sites where prior contests over the labor-capital balance have already been won by labor, workers are able to take advantage of those gains which have been institutionalized into conditions of the local labor market and into the general social structure".

All of these approaches share common features : first, migrants are rational calculators, even though their nationality may be bounded, and second, factors in both the sending and the receiving countries affect their decision to migrate. In the language of migration theory, as already mentioned earlier, there are 'push' factors in sending country and 'pull' factors in the receiving country which determine migration.

The underlying assumption to these approaches is that, for potential migrants, there is some reckoning between conditions in the place of origin and that of destination. If there is a great disparity between the two, migration will increase. If conditions are not much different, the level of migration will be lower. As a result it is predicted that migration will increase during times of economic expansion. This is because economic expansion is uneven, causing relatively more growth in advanced areas than the backward ones. The greater disparities in turn cause greater migration levels. Economic downturns, though, will inhibit migration. "During depression ... a leveling of opportunities occurs and sheer familiarity with the place of residence militates against moving to places where positive factors no longer so heavily outweigh those at home"(Lee, 1966).

2. 3 Weakness of the traditional "push-pull" factors of international migration.

The issues of population or population growth, poverty, and economic stagnation, which have received much attention as key factors promoting emigration are inadequate and need to be reconsidered. The possibility of migration pressures

under these conditions could not be denied, yet it has become evident that by themselves, promotion of large-scale emigration would not be possible. Most of the countries in the Third World which have had one or more of these conditions, do not show any significant emigration. On the contrary, for some countries with high economic growth, significant emigrations have occurred.

Over population or high density cannot be disregarded as it signals the possibility of increased emigration. There is considerable evidence that not all countries with high population growth, or high density, have high emigration.

Poverty which was held to be a basic migration push factor has also failed to explain large scale-emigration. Four interesting points could be raised here to show how it has failed. First, not all countries with extensive poverty have high emigration. Secondly, large-scale emigration from the poorest countries today started late. Therefore, if poverty is a main push factor and could promote large-scale emigration, why do emigrants to the United States since the mid-1960s, and to Japan since the mid-1980s came mainly from the rapidly industrializing countries of Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean (which have received substantial foreign investment from the United States and Japan), rather than from the poorest countries, such as African countries? Further, why did large-scale emigration, in what are today the main sending countries, start when it did and not earlier, since many of these countries were poor long before emigration commenced? Take Haiti and The Dominican Republic immigration into the United States as examples, Haiti was poor long before massive emigration began in the early 1970s and The Dominican Republic had considerable unemployment, under-employment and poverty long before large-scale emigration began in the mid 1960s.[7] The third point is that the poor are supposed to be the main group to emigrate, across international borders, to escape poverty and search for stable income. But the question is, how do the poorest migrate? Basically speaking, the poorest do not migrate because they are not able to. Cornelius (1976) on his study in Mexico, the country which has a large numbers of immigrants in the United States, has explained "those at the very bottom of the local income distribution are not likely to migrate to the United States because they lack even the resources needed to cover the cost of transportation and fees charged by the smugglers." In the Dominican Republic, "there are major legal and financial barriers that prevent the poor from migrating ... reports suggest that it costs U. S. $1,000 —

$2,000, to be provided with papers and smuggled out of the country." (Bray, 1984) Recent studies on Haitian unauthorized migration also report that it costs between U. S. $500 and $1,000 to buy passage aboard barely seaworthy craft bound for south Florida (Miller, 1984). These studies has shown how the poor face financial difficulties to emigrate. However, it is clear in the study of immigration into the United States, it was not only the poor who migrated. A large number of migrants to the United States includes professionals, technicians and entrepreneurs, who migrated not to escape poverty or unemployment at home. These categories of people who earn enough at home to sustain a middle-class standard of living usually do not or seldom migrate. But as figured in 1987, 64,099 persons classified as professionals and managers arrived as permanent residents, where the main sending countries were from Asia : the Philippines with 8,512, India with 5,712, China with 3,264 and Taiwan with 2,924. Fourthly, poverty has been said as a main factor of lower education level in Third World. Those people with lower educational backgrounds were seen as the main groups of emigrants because manual labor does not required high education. But, international migration nowadays includes highly educated people (Saskia Sassen, 1990). For example, in the case of immigration into Japan, the emigrants standard of education is quite high compared with the educational standards of their countries of origin. One study proved that 28 per cent of workers are university graduates, some with post-graduate degrees. Among South Americans of Japanese origin, especially Brazilians and Peruvians, 42 per cent of them are university graduates. This background is totally different from that of the migrant workers in Europe (Sasaki and Sato, 1993).

Another key assumption is emigration due to stagnant economic growth. However, the economic situation in main sending countries of Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean Basin were in good shape with high industrial growth rates and foreign investment. Growth rates in employment and domestic production in these countries were relatively high during the 1960s and 1970s, certainly when compared with the United States market economy, and with other countries which did not have high emigration.[8] For example, South Korea, with one of the highest growth rates in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was also one of the countries with the highest growth rates in migration to the United States and Japan. Its GDP growth during the 1950s and 1960s was 6.9 per cent and increased to

Table 1 Growth of Real GDP

	Annual average compaund growth rates			
	1929-38	1938-50	1950-73	1973-80
Brazil	4.5	5.1	7.3	7.0
Mexico	1.7	6.2	6.3	6.4
Peru	n.a.	4.3	5.1	3.0
Average	2.4	4.6	5.3	4.4
China	0.6	-1.5	6.2	6.0*
India	0.5	0.9	3.5	4.0*
S. Korea	3.5	-2.1	6.9	7.7*
Average	1.6	-0.8	6.1	6.3*
Japan	4.7	-2.7	9.4	3.8
U. S.	-0.7	5.0	3.7	2.2

* 1973-1983

Source: A. Maddison, *Two Crises: Latin America and Asia 1929-38 and 1973-83*, Paris, OECD, 1985, p. 54,and Latin America,the Caribbean and OECD, *A Dialogue on Economic Reality and Policy Options*, Paris, 1986, p. 12.

7.7 per cent during the 1970s. Simultaneously, growth in the United States was not only lower but decreased from 3.7 per cent to 2.2 per cent with an economic situation of high unemployment and recession. As shown in Table 1, the whole average of GDP growth performance in Asian countries is relatively high compared to the United States with 6.1 per cent for 1950-1973 period to 6.3 per cent for 1973-1983 period. Meanwhile, Latin America economy had also enjoyed high economic growth. From 1950s until the beginning of the 1980s, most of the Latin America economies had relatively high growth rates. Its average until 1980 was above 4.0 per cent. Mexico, for example, until 1980 had never experienced a fall in GDP growth since 1940 (See Table 1). Clearly, the long-held assumption that a stagnant economy generates emigration is proved to be insufficient by the facts of the current emigration phase.

2. 4 Investment as a new push factor.

Immigration into the United States since the mid-1960s and into Japan since the mid-1980s shows clearly a contradictory pattern of international migration. It is because emigrants came mainly from the rapidly industrializing countries of Asia and Latin America, rather than from the poorest countries. Moreover, im-

migrants to the United States and Japan were concentrated in a few large cities such as New York City, Los Angeles and San Francisco which troubled with growing unemployment, low-wage, inflation, and, often deindustrialization. Tokyo City also faced a similar pattern, with the growing economic slump, unemployment and increasing job losses. What do these facts imply for theories of migration? This situation is definitely contrary to the old pattern of international migration. To understand the issue well, the process of international migration must be reviewed with a new approach. Depending only on the traditional "push-pull" factors are clearly insufficient to explain contemporary migration process.

Direct foreign investment must be one of the factors which should be considered into the analysis of the emigration process. Foreign investment not only contributes indirectly to the formation and direction of labor migration in various ways, but it could also lead to the highest growth rate in migration. Puerto Rico, for example, by the late 1940s witnessed the impact of the United States investment in the formation of a vast supply of migrant workers.[9] Case studies on this country, at least, has shown a positive network between massive flow of foreign direct investment and a propensity to migrate. It will be useful to mention here that the high economic growth rates in developing sending emigrant countries to the United States and Japan were in good part due to a large increase in direct foreign investment for export oriented production from the United States and Japan.

A large share of direct foreign investment in developing countries has embarked in production for export. Export oriented direct foreign investment is growing at a faster rate than import-substitution. Many countries in Asia and Latin America, with limited internal markets and large reserves of cheap labor, attracted foreign investment for export production to replace the exhaustion of import-substitution as a model for development. The economic situation in these countries in the 1960s, mostly depended on import-substitution, but are now receiving rapidly growing export oriented foreign investment. For example, in Colombia, direct foreign investment flows amounted to about $25 million annually in the early 1970s; by 1979 they had reached $130 million, a rise largely attributed to production for export. Similar trends can be observed in Mexico. Export oriented foreign investment in agriculture and manufacturing which tend to be highly labor-intensive method of production has expanded rapidly, particularly

from the United States and Japan. The expansion of this sector clearly could explain how it has mobilized the population into regional and distant migration.

Before the 1970s, much of the direct foreign investment went to Latin America for export agriculture. In Mexico and the Dominican Republic, export agriculture has mobilized new segments of the population into wage-labor and into regional and international migrations. The development of commercial agriculture, which is almost completely for export, has directly displaced small farmers who are left without means of subsistence. This forces them to become wage-laborers in commercial agriculture or to migrate to cities. Apparently, the relinquishment from sharecropper or subsistence farmer to rural wage-laborer becomes a motivation to move to another country, for example, Mexicans employment in the United States's agriculture. Sometimes this has resulted to an urban job migration in another country, for example, Dominicans to New York City.[10)]

Investment in Export Processing Zones (EPZs) has increased markedly the growth in investment for export manufacturing, financed by direct foreign investors like the United States and Japan. This zone is identified as the Free Trade Zones (FTZs), where foreign and domestic investors are invited to operate their manufacturing plants to produce goods for export. It is an industrial estate, where power (electricity) and other necessary infrastructure are provided by the host government in addition to the various incentives such as tax benefits and exemption from import duties. This might help the foreign collaborators to establish their sub-contractors in an industrial zone with the necessary facilities already available. The vast majority of new multinational employment in developing countries might be in these zones, which now employ about two million people, primarily in textiles and clothing, electronics, automobile parts and, more recently, telematics or in data processing. In Latin America, and the Caribbean, the three countries with the largest number of zones are Mexico, Colombia and the Dominican Republic. In 1975 they accounted for sixteen of the twenty-two zones. These are also countries with large concentration in the export sector, and they account for a very large share of all Hispanic immigrants into the United States. A similar situation can be seen in South-East Asia. India, Malaysia, Philippines and South Korea have more than one zone and they account for a large share of immigrants not only to the United States but also to Japan.

The most important objectives of establishing this zone, beside production for

export, is to create opportunities for industrial employment for unskilled and semi-skilled labor in developing countries. Ironically, however, rather than reducing unemployment in the developing sending countries, the prototypical EPZs has contributed to the condition for emigration. First, many of the zones mainly employ only new (who are entering the labour market for the first time) and young female workers between ages of 18-24 who were not previously employed and mostly all of them came from rural areas. The overwhelming presence of women among production workers in export manufacturing cannot be denied. About 70 per cent of all workers in EPZs are women. At the beginning of the 1980s, young women accounted for 88 per cent of EPZs employment in Sri Lanka, 85 per cent in Malaysia, 75 per cent in South Korea and 74 per cent in the Philippines.[11] The main activity of these female workers lies in the production of garments or in the assembly of electronic components. A major reason for this high proportion of female workers is young women are accustomed to pain-staking work and are adept in detailed work (with "small and nimble fingers") which are a great asset in assembling tiny chips.[12] And the truth is that young women in patriarchal societies are easy to control for maintaining quality control (QC) in production and they can be exploited in lowly-paid,[13] monotonous and hazardous jobs.[14] In Malaysia, for example, in the electronics industry alone, over 90 per cent of all production workers and almost all assembly workers are women. This feminization of the labor force has been found to contribute to male unemployment and in several cases, to male emigration, for example Mexican male emigration into the United States. It is also important to analyze this situation of male migration from South East Asia into Japan since the mid-1980s, and the connection with massive outflows of Japanese direct foreign investment to these countries since 1985, following the Plaza Accord at the Conference of Ministers of the Group of Five Nations (G5).

Second, at the same time, the careers of females in export zones are short-lived, with the average tenure being around five years, because firms in electronics plants, especially semi-conductor assembly plants, prefer docile, agile and unmarried youths. Study by ILO (International Labour Organization) in 1984 shows, semi-conductor industry, one of the largest and fastest growing economic activities in South East Asia, has recorded nine in ten employees are young and unmarried females between 16 and 23 years of age. Those women are laid off with little

possibility of being employed in other firms. These circumstances have added to the ranks of the unemployed and later to female emigration to advanced countries because of ideological and cultural attractions over returning to traditional communities of origin.[15]

Basically, since foreign investment creates jobs it should act as a deterrent to emigration, and this deterrent should be particularly strong in countries with high levels of export-oriented investment because of its labor-intensive nature. But, foreign investment has induced large scale emigration. The point here is direct foreign investment has disrupted the traditional work structures and this situation has contributed to the new pool of unemployed. This mechanism worked in both sectors of commercial agriculture and manufacturing. The development of commercial agriculture has displaced small farmers and transformed them into wage-labor, domestic migration and international migration. In export manufacturing sector, it is mediated by a massive recruitment of young women into newly created jobs in EPZs. Domestic migration (from rural areas to these zones) by these women have been found to contribute to the disruption of traditional employment structures, which often unwaged, notably household production for internal consumption or local market. According to Saskia Sassen (1988), without the introduction of manufacturing production, these women would not have entered waged employment. The large mobilization of these women into wage labor means competing for jobs with men, has contributed to males unemployment and emigration. At the same time, the laid-off women, who were introduced into the new way of life, has limited choices except to emigrate as an option. We could argue here that foreign investment in Latin America, and Southeast Asia, has increased the available supply of cheap labor more than it has increased the domestic demand for such labor. This is true, as Saskia Sassen pointed out, international migration flows have been mainly determined by "the industrialization of production sites through foreign investment".[16]

2. 5 The debt payment as another new push factors.

Another important aspect of foreign investment is the issue of debt repayment. The rigorous policies which developing countries have had to pursue in servicing their enormous debts have reduced their standard of living. In this perverse way, foreign investment has certainly increased the supply of emigrants from the Third

World.[17] The debt crisis came after a decade or more of marked growth in investment flows to developing countries. Since the early 1980s, the full scope of the current debt problems among developing countries became evident. About half of all developing countries have experienced serious debt problems, caused principally by structural weaknesses and inappropriate economic policies. External shocks, such as, world recession, the rapid rise of interest rates and lower export prices for primary commodities did little to help the situation. The "overborrowing" from banks by some developing countries and correspondingly "overlending" by the banks to those developing countries was also one of the main reasons.[18] OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) reported in a 1983 survey that of the 157 countries and territories covered, some 35 countries were involved in discussions with creditor groups regarding delays or non-payment of debt service. More significantly, these 35 countries represented around one-half

Table 2 External debt 1973-86, debt and exports per capita Latin America countries and Asian Countries in 1986 ($ million)

	1973	1982	1986	1986	1986
	External debt			Debt per capita	Exports per capita
Argentina	7,890	43,634	46,167	1,490	221
Brazil	12,866	91,027	106,174	773	163
Chile	3,179	17,342	19,410	1,584	345
Colombia	2,320	10,302	14,619	505	176
Mexico	8,990	85,890	97,662	1,227	204
Peru	3,213	11,636	14,575	721	124
6 Latin American Countries	35,467	248,195	298,607	1,050	206
Bangladesh	4,165	1,656	7,407	74	9
China	0	8,358	21,993	21	30
India	10,625	22,816	36,814	48	12
Indonesia	6,534	26,500	42,038	252	89
Pakistan	4,251	10,069	12,584	127	34
Philippines	1,936	23,483	27,000	491	87
Korea	3,968	36,495	43,560	1,048	835
Taiwan	2,000	9,654	12,693	655	2,056
Thailand	903	11,496	16,971	326	169
9 Asian Countries	34,382	153,527	221,060	338	69

Source: A. Maddison, *The World Economy in the 20th century*, OECD, Paris, 1989, p. 93.

of the total number of countries with outstanding debt of more than $1 billion in 1983.[19] Among the developing countries, Latin America suffered the most serious foreign debt problems. The worst case was Argentina, but the situation was equally serious in Brazil and Mexico. The least debt per capita in Latin America countries was in Colombia. In 1983, Brazil and Mexico together accounted for 25 per cent of the total debt service. In the case of Mexico, debt difficulties were dramatised in August 1982 when it announced that it could no longer meet its debt payments obligations and had to have recourse to debt rescheduling. Except the Philippines, none of the Asian countries had a serious debt problem due to lower external indebtedness or to successful adjustment policies, not even South Korea with its high debts, because its per capita exports were very high. Thailand which relies heavily on external borrowing has managed to avoid the crisis, and has continued to experience high growth based on export-oriented policies. Table 2 shows the seriousness of the problem for all of the countries in Latin America except Colombia. We could also see that per capita debt of Latin America is three times as high as in Asia, and per capita exports are lower. In reality, all of these countries were among the top recipients of direct foreign investment but later confronted with the serious problem of debt repayment. Today, they are the top sender of emigrants to the United States or Japan. It is also important to argue here that debt problems, relating to foreign investment, which attribute to the reduction of the standard of living in developing countries, are considered as indirect factor contributing to the supply of emigrants.

3. TREND IN DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT.

Foreign direct investment has grown rapidly over a long period and has played an important role in the growth of the world economy. It outstripped growth in production and trade through the 1970s and 1980s. The growth of this investment and large multi national enterprises (MNEs) engaged in research, production and distribution activities has been quite unprecedented. Aggregate foreign direct investment grew much more rapidly than either foreign trade, the traditional international "engine of growth", or domestic product in the 1970s and 1980s.

After a long period of growth, foreign direct investment experienced a slow-

Table 3 Outward direct investment flows of OECD member countries

($ million)

Cumulative flows			Annual flows					
1961/70	1971/80	1981/86	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
70,576	301,106	294,403	49,740	23,193	29,545	38,441	60,464	93,080

Source : A. Maddison, *The World Economy in the 20th century*, OECD, Paris, 1989, p. 21.

down in the mid-1970s and was a strong impact on economic development in developing countries. It subsequently took off again, after declining somewhat between and 1982 when its annual flows fell to $23 billion, compared to almost $50 billion in the previous year, reaching a record level in 1985 of $60 billion and again in 1986 of $93 billion (See Table 3).

Until the mid-1970s, the bulk of direct foreign investment from the United States grew rapidly in OECD countries and the rest of the world. From 1954 through 1966, the U. S. direct foreign investment abroad grew from $17.7 billion to $67 billion, or 379 per cent. This trend began to decline in the 1970s. The United States direct foreign investment grew from $67 billion in 1969 to $148.8 billion in 1977, or only by 222 per cent. In the early 1980s the U. S. growth rate of direct foreign investment declined considerably, to 5 per cent in 1981, the lowest rate since the Second World War. Nevertheless, after a very considerable drop in United States outward investment in 1982 and 1984, the United States has again become the leading major source of foreign direct investment, with 1986 outward flows exceeding $27 billion. As can be seen from Table 4, the United States is still one of the major sources of direct foreign investment eventhough its position has changed quite significantly between 1981 and 1986, as compared to its position in the 1960s and 1970s. United States outward investment flows in 1985, 1986 and 1987, at $18 billion, $27 billion and $44 billion respectively, made the single largest source of international direct investment among OECD member countries. Between 1981 and 1986, the United States accounted for 22 per cent of total outward flows from OECD countries, as opposed to over 65 per cent of such flows for the 1960s, and 44 per cent for the 1970s. Therefore, while remaining a major source country, its relative position has declined significantly in part due to the growth of outward investment by other countries, especially Japan but also due to very low (sometimes negative) outflows which

Table 4 Outward direct investment flows from U. S. and Japan

	Cumulative flow of FDI						Flows of FDI						
	1961/70	%	1971/80	%	1981/88	%	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
U. S.	46,882	66.3	134,354	44.4	121,230	21.6	9,620	-2,360	380	2,820	18,070	27,070	44,470	20,420
Annual Average	468		13,435		15,154									
Japan	1,438	2.0	18,052	6.0	93,672	16.7	4,894	4,540	3,612	5,969	6,452	14,480	19,519	34,210
Annual Average	144		1,805		11,709									

Source : OECD, various datas.

occurred between 1982 and 1984.

Japan has been emerging as a major investor among the OECD countries particularly since the beginning of the 1980s. Japan accounted for nearly 17 per cent of total outward flows from OECD countries in 1981 and 1986 in comparison to 6 per cent for the 1970s and only 2 per cent in the 1960s. From 1981 to 1985, Japanese outward investment averaged about $5 billion per annum, and in 1986 witnessed a major jump to $14.5 billion and to 19.5 billion in 1987 (see Table 4). In 1988, Japanese foreign direct investment flows exceeded the flows from the United States with $34 billion and became the largest single source of foreign investment from this year onwards.

3. 1 General trend in the developing countries.

The level of investment in developing countries has grown at a fairly rapid pace, particularly since the late 1960s. The annual average growth rate in these countries during the 1970s surpassed that in developed countries. Data from OECD has shown that the total direct foreign investment for all major industrial countries in developing countries increased from $35 billion in 1967, $43 billion in 1970, to $76 billion in 1976 (see Table 5). The United States's direct foreign investment position went from $22 billion in 1970 to $37 billion in 1976. Although its share has declined slightly, the United States accounts for almost half of the total direct foreign investment in 1976 with 48.6 per cent compared to 52.2 in 1970. In the case of Japan direct foreign investment went from $1 billion to $5 billion in the same period,[20] however its share is lower than the United States, with less than 7 per cent in 1976.

Table 5 Foreign direct investment position in developing countries by OECD-DAC countries, 1970-1976

OECD-DAC countries	$ millions		Share of total(%)	
	1970	1976	1970	1976
Belgium	765	1,255	1.8	1.7
Canada	1,659	2,960	3.9	3.9
France	3,832	5,254	9.0	6.9
Germany (Fed. Rep.)	1,942	5,970	4.6	7.8
Italy	1,245	2,446	2.9	3.2
Japan	1,218	4,970	2.8	6.5
Netherlands	2,247	3,503	5.3	4.6
Switzerland	875	1,657	2.1	2.2
United Kingdom	5,912	9,323	13.8	12.2
United States	22,300	36,990	52.2	48.6
Others	717	1,872	1.7	2.4
Total	42,712	76,200	100.0	100.0

Source: OECD, *Investing in Developing Countries*, Paris, 1978, p. 114.

Table 6 Average annual growth rate of direct foreign investment from developed to developing countries, 1960-1978

1960-1968	7.0%
1968-1973	9.2%
1973-1978	19.4%

Source: OECD, *Recent International Direct Investment*, Paris, 1981, p. 43.

Table 6 shows that the average annual growth rates of direct foreign investment from developed countries grew significantly from 7 per cent from 1960 to 1968, to 9.2 per cent from 1968 to 1973, and 19.4 per cent from 1973 to 1978. In the case of the United States itself, the average annual growth rate for developing countries also grew significantly; from 1950 to 1966 it was 6.2 per cent, growing to 9.7 per cent during 1966 to 1973, and jumped to 14.2 per cent from 1973 to 1980. In absolute values, direct foreign investment in these countries grew from $3.5 billion in 1950 to $8.8 billion in 1966 and $42.4 billion in 1980 (see Table 7).

As explained earlier, foreign direct investment in the mid-1970s experienced a slowdown after a long period of growth. Total net flow from the OECD coun-

Table 7 Average annual growth rates of U.S. direct investment position abroad, by region, 1950-1980, U. S.

	Amount (millions $)				Average annual growth rates (%)		
	1950	1966	1973	1980	1950-66	1966-73	1973-80
Developed countries	4,715	27,629	56,303	122,911	11.7	10.7	11.8
Developing countries	3,567	8,815	16,830	42,413	6.2	9.7	14.2

Source: Saskia Sassen (1988), p. 101, based on Obie G. Whichard (1981).

Table 8 Total DFI flows from OECD to developing countries 1979-1987

Current $ bilion									Per cent of total		
1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1980	1985	1987
13.4	11.2	17.2	12.8	9.9	11.4	6.7	12.2	13.2	8.7	8.0	15.5

Source: OECD, *Financing and External Debt of Developing Countries*, 1987 survey.

tries stood at only $13 billion in 1979 and $11 billion in 1980. However in 1981 it rose to $17 billion. Table 8 shows, direct foreign investment in developing countries has remained fairly steady between 1979 and 1987 despite a fall in 1985, and averaging around $10-$11 billion per annum.

International direct foreign investment in developing countries tends to be concentrated in a limited number of regions and countries. Latin America has been the region consistently attracting the largest share of such investment, roughly 55 per cent during the period 1971-1988. Asia follows with a share increasing from 15 per cent in 1971 to 25 per cent in 1980. Over the period 1980-1986, 18 developing countries received 86 per cent of foreign direct investment. Fourteen of them were, for Latin America and the Caribbean, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela ; and for Asia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.[21] As mentioned above, in recent years, Japan has become the largest source of direct foreign investment to developing countries, ahead of both the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States. After falling off between 1981 and 1983, Japanese investment in the developing countries picked up again in 1985, as a result of the appreciation of the yen, to the benefit of both Latin America and South East Asia.

The growing share of services in total international direct investment in developing countries is important to note here. It has increased considerably as

compared with manufacturing investment. The bulk of this investment has been in banking, insurance, advertising, information and engineering consultation. Among the host country, 29 developing countries account for 75 per cent of the stock investment in services. In 1985, 50 per cent of United States investment in developing countries was in services; the respective share for Japan (together with Germany and the Netherlands) being 40 per cent.[22]

3. 2. Patterns of flows in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Latin America traditionally received over half of the total direct investment going to developing countries, but for the period 1981-1986, its share fell to around 48 per cent, in comparison to around 52 per cent for 1976-1980. Table 9 shows investment flows to regions which have remained fairly flat since 1981, averaging between $5 billion to $6 billion per annum, except for a sharp fall in 1983 to just over $3 billion. Mexico, Brazil and Argentina have been the major recipient countries in the region. These three countries accounted for 46 per cent of flows to Latin America in 1976-1980 and attracted 25 per cent in 1981-1986. It may useful to state here that Mexico became the main emigrant sending country to the United States since the mid-1960s and Brazil to Japan since the mid-1980s (see Chapter 4).

The United States has traditionally been the major investors in Latin America (see Table 10). The United States has been the main investment source to Mexico, Brazil, Peru and other Latin American countries for the 1980-1984 period. In 1985-1988, the U. S. share was the main source in Latin America excluding Brazil and Peru. For example, the United States investment in Brazil has grown steadily from $5.4 billion in 1981 to $6.5 billion in 1984 with the 1985 level being $7.1 billion. The situation for Mexico, a main emigrant sending countries to the United States, is relatively similar, although the 1984 and 1985 levels of United States investment for both years, at around $4 billion, has not yet surpassed the 1981 level of $5.2 billion.

Historically, Mexico is among the developing countries that have received the most foreign investment. Net foreign investment reached almost $13.5 billion from 1955 to 1982, the period when Mexico's manufacturing industry grew the fastest.[23] In constant 1985 dollars, accumulated foreign direct investment corresponded to a little over $27 billion, equivalent to nearly 20 per cent of Mexico's

Table 9 International direct invesyment in Latin America by DAC countries, 1976-1983

	US $ million								
	Cumulative flows				Annual flows				
	1976 / 80	% [a]	1981 / 86	% [a]	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Latin America	27,872.2	51.6	32,641.9	47.8	6,234.9	5,897.9	3,817.3	5,899.1	5,057.1	5,735.5
Mexico	3,740.9		751.8		1,225.7	-1,038.5	-325.5	580.2	359.4	-49.5
Argentina	2,370.1		1,653.2		580.1	378.9	104.7	134.6	171.5	283.4
Brazil	6,717.1		5,855.5		1,348.5	1,609.8	674.0	1,478.5	549.2	195.5
Total developing countries	53,974.4		68,240.4		16,850.8	12,358.2	9,127.4	11,332.1	6,527.3	12,044.6

a : Share of the total developing countries.
Source : OECD, 1989, *International Direct Investment and the New Economic Environment*, The Tokyo Round Table, p. 45.

GDP (Table 11). From 1971 through 1981, the year before the international recession, the flow of foreign direct investment was growing at an average rate of 18 per cent, or 8 per cent in constant dollars, per year. In the late 1960s, Mexico had received more foreign direct investment relative to the size of its economy due to its proximity to the United States, the main source of foreign direct investment to Latin America, and because of its economic and political stability. In 1981, well over half of foreign direct investment in Mexico originated in just one country : of the $9.9 billion of foreign direct investment in manufacturing that year, 64.3 per cent came from the United States and only 2.7 per cent came from Japan.

Even the United States has been the main investor in Latin America for long, by comparison, there has been a relative growth in investment by Japanese, though much of this has been channelled to the Caribbean Basin.

3. 3 Patterns of flows in Asia.

Asia's share of total foreign direct investment flows to developing countries has increased substantially, from 21.5 per cent in 1976-1980 to 29.8 per cent for 1981-1986. The annual average flow for the period 1981-1986 was $3.4 billion, in comparison to $2.3 billion for 1976-1980. As seen from Table 12, annual inflows dropped significantly after 1981 and particularly in 1985. Although inflows picked up again in 1986,

Table 10 Most important source of Foreign direct investment for selected countries in Latin America and Asia

		1980-84 Average		1985-88 Average	
	Host Country	Source of Investment	Share of Total (%)	Source of Investment	Share of Total (%)
Latin America	Mexico	United States	62.7	United States	60.5
	Brazil	United States	48.3	European Community	48.8
	Argentina	United States	50.3	United States	49.7
	Chile	European Community	45.1	United States	45.1
	Venezuela	United States	59.6	United States	44.7
	Colombia	United States	60.1	United States	98.1
	Peru	United States	29.0	European Community	23.0
	Bolivia	United States	79.3	United States	82.1
Asia	Korea	United States	46.6	Japan	51.8
	Hong Kong	United States	55.8	Japan	31.9
	Singapore	United States	51.6	Japan	51.6
	Taiwan	United States	37.1	Japan	30.9
	Thailand	United States	27.6	Japan	46.1
	Malaysia	United States	22.2	United States	30.8
	Indonesia	European Community	24.4	European Community	28.9
	Philippines	United States	55.7	United States	61.5
	China	United States	67.0	United States	61.0
	Pakistan	European Community	40.2	United States	51.3
	Papua New Guinea	United States	44.2	United States	42.7

Source : World Investment Report 1991 : *The Triad in Foreign Direct Investment*, United Nations, July, 1991.

they are still well below the 1981 peak. This change is due to Asia's ability to attract higher levels of inward investment and in part to the declining share of international direct investment received by other regions, particularly in Latin America. South East Asia, more importantly, has a number of features that make it attractive to international direct investment. For instance, Indonesia and Thailand have large domestic markets ; Malaysia, Hong Kong and Taiwan have large, cheap and well-trained industrial workforces ; Malaysia and Indonesia are also well-endowed with natural resources such as oil, tin, palm oil and timber. The attitude of Asian countries towards international direct investment is also changing. Because of the deterioration in their trade balance as a result of the fall in commodity prices, some Asia countries have started to open their economies to foreign capital. For example, the South Korea government has intro-

Table 11 Foreign direct investment flows to Mexico, 1955-1982

	Equity capital	Rein-vested earnings	Purchase of foreign enterprises	Total	Equity capital	Rein-vested earnings	Purchase of foreign enterprises	Total
	Milion current dollars				Million 1985 dollars			
Accumu-lated flows								
1955-1961	617.1	266.7	-116.5	767.3	2,790.0	1,196.0	-499.4	3,486.6
1962-1973	1,640.1	1,151.6	-114.6	2,677.1	5,422.5	3,720.9	-374.5	8,768.6
1974-1977	1,121.4	1,005.7	-51.0	2,076.1	2,246.9	2,051.0	-104.2	4,193.7
1978-1982	392.5	4,103.2	-69.7	7,946.0	5,238.4	5,456.0	-106.6	10,587.8
Total	7,291.1	6,527.2	-351.8	13,466.5	15,697.8	12,423.9	-1,084.7	27,037.0
Annual average								
1955-1961	88.2	38.1	-16.6	109.7	398.6	170.9	-71.3	498.1
1962-1973	136.7	96.0	-9.6	223.1	451.9	310.1	-31.2	730.8
1974-1977	280.4	251.4	-12.8	519.0	561.7	512.8	-26.1	1,048.4
1978-1982	782.5	820.6	-13.9	1,589.2	1,047.7	1,091.2	-21.3	2,117.6
1955-1982	260.4	233.1	-12.6	480.9	560.6	443.7	-38.7	965.6

Source: Willson P. Nunez, *Foreign Direct Investment and Industrial Development in Mexico*, OECD, Paris, 1990, p. 16.

duced a policy of liberalizing the entry of foreign capital and announced the opening up of several sectors to foreign investment in October 1985. The Singapore government has introduced a package of new policies to revitalize the economy and to make it easier for foreign firms to set up and establish its head offices. Thailand and Malaysia are also implementing more flexible policies towards foreign investors. China, a socialist country and formerly a centrally planned economy, has also opened up its economy to foreign investment. As a result of these new policies, the attitude of foreign investors have also changed. Since 1985, following the G5 Plaza Accord, the rise of the Japanese yen has helped to increase the share of Japanese investment in total foreign direct investment in Asian countries. Among developing countries, those in Asia have received the largest share of Japanese direct foreign investment. 45 per cent of the total approvals in developing countries through the 1988 fiscal year (March 1989) went to developing Asian economies and has been concentrated in manufacturing. Annual reported Japanese DFI in Asia increased rapidly from US $ 2.3 billion in 1986, to US $ 4.9 billion in 1987, and US $ 6.4 billion in 1988. The total for these three years, US $ 13.6 billion, is more than the total for the entire

1951-1981 period (US $ 13.1 billion) and almost two-and-a-half times the total for the 1982-1984 period (US $ 5.5 billion).

As in Latin America, direct foreign investment flows to Asia are concentrated in a small number of countries : Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and China. These countries received over 90 per cent of foreign investment in Asia between 1981-1985. China, for example, has emerged as a major host for foreign investment, absorbing 12 per cent of all inflows to developing countries in the 1984-1988 period. In fact, China, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand are the main emigrant countries to the United States and Japan.

For South East Asia, the influence of Japan's direct foreign investment is large. Since 1986 Japan's direct foreign investment in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia has grown rapidly. The majority of these investments were for the purpose of export oriented manufacture, and were concentrated in the automobile and electronics industries. In Malaysia, up until 1986, which has a significant number of illegal immigrants in Japan, Japan emerged as the largest

Table 12 Foreign direct investment in Asian developing countries by DAC countries

US $ million

	Cumulative flows				Annual flows					
	1976 / 80	%	1981 / 86	%	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Asia	11,622.3	21.5	20,336.6	29.8	6,504.8	2,459.0	3,412.4	4,731.2	694.2	2,535.0
Hong Kong	1,247.3		3,686.3		1,087.8	651.8	603.0	696.4	-134.5	778.7
Indonesia	1,015.4		3,096.3		2,583.5	537.4	302.7	494.6	311.3	-506.6
Korea	88.2		1,062.2		260.6	107.3	-62.4	246.2	168.1	362.4
Singapore	1,304.3		3,484.2		979.5	280.4	417.8	889.6	327.3	589.6
Taiwan	294.1		885.4		118.9	57.1	120.1	208.1	109.7	271.5
Thailand	355.0		767.7		219.3	127.9	200.1	348.3	-96.9	-31.0
Philippines	871.0		71.3		14.4	125.6	-168.2	167.1	-248.9	81.3
Total developing countries	53,970.4		68,240.4		16,350.8	12,358.2	9,127.4	11,332.1	6,527.3	12,044.6

Source : OECD, *International Direct Investment and the New Economic Environment*, Paris, 1989, p. 51.

source of direct foreign investment stock with 43 per cent. In Taiwan, Japanese investment accounts for 42 per cent of foreign investment, up by 26 per cent in 1985.[24] In China, Japan's direct foreign investment in 1986 accounted for 11.5 per cent, behind Hong Kong and Macao, but above the United States.

4. TREND IN IMMIGRATION.

4. 1 Trend in immigration into the United States.

Until the liberalization period[25] (1965 to the present), European origins were the main majority of immigrants to the United States. Europeans accounted for 68.9 per cent of all immigrants to the United States from 1821-1830 and increased to 96.4 per cent in the 1890s. However, by the 1950s the number of European immigrants decreased to 53.1 per cent and during 1981-1983, their immigration further decreased to 11.1 per cent. A profound shift had occurred between European and Asian immigrants (see Table 13). Asian immigrants which accounted for only 2 per cent in the 1890s, increased tremendously to 48.9 per cent during 1981-1983 period.

According to the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), not only Asian but also Latin American and the Caribbean now provide the vast majority of immigrants to the United States. Table 14 shows that by 1985 Europe's share had shrunk to one-ninth, with actual numbers declining from almost 140,000 enteries in 1960 to 63,000 entries in 1985. In contrast, the numbers from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean increased markedly. Asian enteries increased by 89.4 per cent from 24,956 in 1960 to 236,097 in 1980. This figure reached almost 265,000 in 1985. Latin America and the Caribbean entries also reached over 200,000 entries in 1985. Asian and Latin American countries, between 1972 to 1979 provided the ten largest immigrant groups in the United States (see Table 15). Mexico, with over half a million is by far the largest single sender of immigrants, followed by the Philippines with 290,000, South Korea with 225,000, China with 160,000 and India with 140,000.

Many of the Asia, Latin America and Caribbean sending countries have one of their largest cities in the United States. According to Portes and Rumbaut (1990) Los Angeles' Mexican population is second to Mexico City, Monterrey and

Table 13 Distribution of Asian and European Immigrants

Period	Total, Worldwide	Europe		Asia	
		No.	%	No.	%
1821-1983	51,406,446	36,534,209	71.0	4,131,176	8.0
1821-1830	143,439	98,797	68.9	30	0.02
1831-1840	599,125	495,681	82.7	55	0.009
1841-1850	1,713,251	1,597,442	93.2	141	0.08
1851-1860	2,598,214	2,452,577	94.4	41,538	1.6
1861-1870	2,314,824	2,065,141	89.2	64,759	2.8
1871-1880	2,812,191	2,271,325	80.8	124,160	4.4
1881-1890	5,246,613	4,735,484	90.3	69,942	1.3
1891-1900	3,687,564	3,555,352	96.4	74,862	2.0
1901-1910	8,795,386	8,056,040	31.6	323,543	3.7
1911-1920	5,735,811	4,321,887	75.3	247,236	4.3
1921-1930	4,107,209	1,463,194	60.0	112,053	2.7
1931-1940	528,431	347,552	65.8	16,081	3.0
1941-1950	1,035,033	621,124	60.0	32,360	3.1
1951-1960	2,514,479	1,325,727	53.1	125,249	4.9
1961-1970	3,321,677	1,123,492	33.8	427,642	12.9
1971-1980	4,493,314	800,368	17.8	1,588,178	35.3
1981-1983	1,750,494	194,736	11.1	855,335	48.9

Source: Luciano Mangiafico(1988 : 6), based on U. S. Department of Justice, *1983 Statistical Yearbook of the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.*

Table 14 Immigrants admitted by selected origin, 1960, 1980, 1985

Selected origins	1960	1980	1985
Europe	138,426	72,121	63,043
Asia	24,956	236,097	264,691
Others	2,319	13,981	17,117
Latin America and the Caribbean	66,440	186,077	209,718
Mexico	32,684	52,096	61,077
Caribbean	14,047	73,296	83,281
Central America	6,661	20,968	26,302
South America	13,048	39,717	39,058
Total immigrants admitted	265,398	530,639	570,009

Source: Saskia Sassen(1988 : 63), based on *U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.*

Table 15 Top immigration flows from Asia, Latin America, and Caribbean, 1972-1979

	Total
Mexico	530,378
Philippines	289,429
Korea (South)	225,339
China (Taiwan and People's Republic)	160,454
India	139,834
Dominican Republic	118,147
Jamaica	108,454
Colombia	59,829
Trinidad and Tobago	49,492
Haiti	44,721
Hong Kong	40,438

Source: Saskia Sassen (1988: 65), based on U. S. INS.

Guadalajara, and Santo Domingo holds precarious advantage over Dominican New York.

The U. S. Bureau of the Cencus recorded 9.6 million immigrants in 1970 and increased to 13.9 million in 1980, representing 6.2 per cent of the total population. The large increases in annual entries in 1980, as mentioned above, were Asians and Hispanics. The share of persons of Hispanic origin recorded by the Cencus Bureau increased by 62 per cent from 1970 to 1980 and those of Asian origin by 100 per cent. In next ten years, between 1980 and 1990, Hispanic origin increased by 53 per cent, while Asian origin by 107.8 per cent. The 1980 census counted 14.6 million persons of Hispanic origin and 3.5 million Asians, representing respectively 6.5 per cent and 1.5 per cent of the total population of 226.5 million (see Table 16). In 1990, both are increased to 22.4 million and 7.2 million respectively.

Asian immigrants, in terms of legal admissions from 1970 to 1980, was the fastest-growing group with immigrants arriving mainly from the the Philippines, South Korea, China and India. The INS reports that 1.5 million Asians were admitted legally between these years. Compared to other regions, there was no decline at all in the case of Asians; entries reached 258,000 from 1965 to 1969, rose to 574,000 from 1970 to 1974 and reached 1,612,000 from 1980 to 1985. In the case of Latin Americans, except for a decrease between 1970 to 1974, entries also increased steadily (see Table 17).

Table 16 Foreign born in the U. S., 1970 and 1980

	1970	1980
U. S. total population (a)	203,302,031	226,504,825
Foreign born (b)	9,619,302	13,956,077
(b)/(a) (%)	4.7	6.2

Source : Saskia Sassen 1988 : 69), based on U. S. Bureau of the Census.

Table 17 Immigrants admitted by area : Asian and Latin America(including the Caribbean), 1955-1985

Years	1955-1959	1960-1964	1965-1969	1970-1974	1975-1979	1980-1985	Total
Asia	98,856	117,140	258,229	574,222	879,178	1,612,398	3,540,021
Latin America (including Caribbean)	69,003	143,789	170,663	148,835	229,539	367,777	1,529,606
Others	78,557	120,337	351,806	318,680	413,715	444,828	1,727,923
Total	246,516	381,266	780,598	1,041,753	1,522,432	2,425,001	6,397,550

Source : Saskia Sassen 1988 : 63), based on U. S. INS.

Among the Asian population in the United States between 1970 and 1980, Chinese immigration increased by 85.3 per cent and was the largest immigrant groups, followed by Filipinos with an increased of 125.8 per cent over their 1970 level. South Korean had the highest growth rates with 412.8 per cent and their numbers jumped from 69,000 in 1970 to almost 355,000 in 1980. As can be seen from Table 18, the Japanese, the largest single Asian nationality in 1970, fell to the third in size in 1980.

U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1987 Annual Report, reported that 71 per cent of 601,516 foreign persons admitted for legal permanent residence went to six states : California with 26.8 per cent, New York with 19 per cent, Florida with 9.1 per cent, Texas with 7 per cent, New Jersey with 5.1 per cent and Illinois with 4.3 per cent. On the other extreme, no state received fewer than two hundred immigrants, the least favored being Wyoming with 261 and Dakota with 304.

Figure 2, portrays the national composition of immigrant flows to the five major receiving urban areas. Together these cities accounted for a large percentage of legal immigration during 1987.[26] It shows there is much diversity in the origins of immigrants going to these five cities. The principal flows to New York, the premier destination of immigrants, come from the Caribbean, which includes

Table 18 Main nationalities of Asian population in the U. S., 1970-1980

	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Korean
1970	435,022.0	343,060.0	591,290.0	69,130.0
1980	806,027.0	774,640.0	700,747.0	354,529.0
Percent increase	85.3	125.8	18.5	412.8

Source : Saskia Sassen (1988 : 71), based on U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1973 and 1981.

Figure 2 Composition of immigrant flows to five major metropolitan destinations, 1987.



Source : A. Portes and Rumbaut (1990), based on U.S. INS. 1987 *Annual Report*

Dominicans and Haitians, followed by Jamaicans and Guyanese. Mexicans form the largest group in Los Angeles and Chicago, while Asians jointly compose half of the inflow in San Francisco, a traditional place of settlement for Asians.

Illegal (undocumented) migrant workers also present significant numbers in immigration into the United States. Their numbers can be found through illegal entries, referred to as "entries without inspection" (EWIs) by the INS, legal entries but abuse their visas by overstaying or working without a proper visa, including those whose documents are fraudulent. The exact number is unknown, but through the number of deportable migrants, it shows a significant increase. In 1964, the number of deportable migrants was only 86,597 and increased to 788,145 in 1974 and reached 1,138,566 in 1984. This represents an increase of over 1,300 per cent between 1964 and 1984. About 90 per cent of deportable migrants came from the first category, EWIs, and almost all of them were Mex-

Table 19 Destinations of Major Immigrant Groups in Selected Years

Nationality	Year	N	As % of Total % in Top Three		Most Common Destinations					
			Immigration	Destinations	First	(%)	Second	(%)	Third	(%)
Mexican	1967	42,371	12	20	Los Angeles		Chicago		El Paso	
	1975	62,205	16	21	Los Angeles		Chicago		El Paso	
	1979	52,096	11	17	El Paso		Los Angeles		Houston	
	1984	57,557	11	28	Los Angeles		Chicago		El Paso	
	1987	72,351	12	33	Los Angeles	21	El Paso	6	San Diego	6
Dominican	1967	11,514	3	91	New York		San Juan		Miami	
	1975	14,066	4	85	New York		San Juan		Jersey City	
	1979	17,519	4	81	New York		San Juan		Bergen-Passic	
	1984	23,147	4	79	New York		San Juan		Bergen-Passic	
	1987	24,858	4	76	New York	60	San Juan	11	Bergen-Passic	4
Filipino	1967	10,865	3	26	San Francisco		Honolulu		New York	
	1975	31,751	8	20	San Francisco		Los Angeles		Honolulu	
	1979	41,300	9	18	San Francisco		Los Angeles		Honolulu	
	1984	42,768	8	28	Los Angeles		San Francisco		Honolulu	
	1987	50,060	8	30	Los Angeles	16	San Francisco	7	San Diego	7
Chinese	1987	25,841	4	53	New York	27	San Francisco	15	Los Angeles	11
Indian	1987	27,803	5	22	New York	10	Chicago	8	Los Angeles	4
Korean	1987	35,849	6	29	Los Angeles	16	New York	8	Washington	4

Source: A. Portes and G. Rumbaut(1990:38-47), based on U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Annual Reports.*

ican males.

Table 19 presents the relevant information from 1967 to 1987. Mexicans and Dominicans represent approximately the same proportion of total immigration throughout these years, increasing slightly in 1987. Filipino immigration experienced a significant absolute in relative increase between 1967 and 1975 and then stabilized at about 9 per cent of the total. The three largest immigrant groups arriving in 1987 were Mexican (72,351), Filipino (50,060) and Korean (35,849). These three countries preferred Los Angeles as a place of destination ; Mexicans with 21 per cent, Filipinos and Koreans both with 16 per cent. New York was the choice of Indians (10 per cent), Chinese (27 per cent) and Dominicans (60 per cent) immigrants.

Next to Los Angeles and New York is San Francisco, the second choice for Chinese and Filipinos, and San Diego is the third for Filipinos and Mexicans. As can be seen from the same table, Dominicans predominate in San Juan and Mexicans in El Paso. For third settlement choice, Chicago for Mexicans and Honolulu for Filipinos (see Figure 2).

4. 2 Trend in immigration into Japan.

Japan has been the only nation among all other advanced countries which prohibits general immigration. It has never tried to introduce immigrant workers even in its 'miracle economic growth period' of the 1960s or 'high-growth period' of the 1980s, eventhough it has suffered a serious labor shortage problem especially in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), caused by the so-called "bubble economy". For example, in 1990, 310 companies went into bankruptcy because of a lack of employees. By September 1991, this number had jumped to over 400 companies. In addition to protecting the domestic labor market, "four-clause theory", i. e. large population, small countries, scarce natural resources and homogeneous society, is often cited as the main reasons for Japanese immigration policy.[27)]

However, rapid internationalization of the Japanese economy has changed this situation. The G5 Plaza Accord became a decisive turning point in terms of the emergence of migrant workers in Japan. The rise of the yen has forced Japanese companies to move their operations overseas mostly in the form of subsidiaries, joint-ventures, or direct investment, in the search of cheap labor and to

meet the labor shortage at home.

Since then, Japan has started to increase its investment in the developing countries of Asia and Latin America. Incidently, it has emerged as a new destination for emigrants from these countries. The inflow of foreign workers has increased dramatically as compared to the years before 1985. In 1950, the number of immigrants was only 19,542 persons. It increased to 2,259,894 persons or 125.2 times in 1985. It declined in small numbers in 1986 and 1987. But again increased in 1988 to 2,414,447 and reached over 3,500,000 persons in 1990. Over two-thirds came from developing countries of Asia and Latin America (see Table 20). From other statistics, the number of registered foreigners in 1991 increased by 24 per cent over the number in the 1987, recorded at 1,075,000, and was comprised of more than two-thirds from Asian and Latin American countries (see Table 21). This number hit around 1,281,644 at the end of 1992.

However, it is quite difficult to calculate the direct figure of migrant workers in Japan. The total number of migrant workers working in Japan is estimated to be 643,000, equivalent to 1 per cent of the total working population in Japan. Almost half of the total number of migrant workers are employed illegally and almost all of them fall under the label of "unskilled laborers" in Japanese immigration law. They are utilized as a cushion between economic booms and economic recessions. In other words, they are "easily hired and fired" because they are in the weakest position in terms of working conditions. Estimated numbers of illegal migrants by Immigration Office, as November 1991, was 216,399 persons. (see Table 22) It was reported that mostly of them, especially males, are factory and construction workers or day laborers who perform the three "D's" -difficult, dirty and dangerous jobs (in Japanese, the 3 Ks ; kitsui, kitanai, kiken), which Japanese younger workers who are becoming more educated and choosy, shown a reluctance to do. On the other side, females are found to be working as "hostess" or other related "entertainment" jobs. As in the United States, their numbers also can be investigated through the number of persons caught violating immigration laws, such as illegal entries, illegal landings, working without proper visa from the immigration authorities, and over staying their visas. As shown in Table 23, the numbers of migrants prosecuted for working illegally reached almost 30,000 in 1990, a 62 per cent increased from 1987. The overwhelming majority of these illegal migrant workers are from the Asian countries of South

Table 20 Number of Foreigners Entering Japan Classified by Nationality / Areas of Origin

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Asia	1,014,787	1,136,710	1,387,050	1,791,652	2,164,373
Korea(South)	299,602	360,159	515,807	806,065	978,984
Taiwan	300,272	360,636	392,723	501,907	610,652
China	75,275	73,030	112,389	100,144	117,814
Pilippines	80,508	85,267	86,567	88,296	108,292
South America	26,488	25,797	31,269	48,778	92,863
Brazil	13,434	12,126	16,789	29,241	67,303
North America	550,200	551,991	530,767	611,779	644,525
Europe	358,365	376,164	395,843	451,968	516,450
Oceania	56,784	57,777	56,542	67,390	71,547
Stateless	4,055	3,241	2,938	2,544	2,617
Total	2,021,450	2,161,275	2,414,447	2,985,764	3,504,470

Source: *Statistics on Immigration Control 1990*, Japan Immigration Association.

Table 21 Foreign Residents in Japan Registered at Local Councils (thousands)

Area of origin	1969	(%)	1987	(%)	1991	(%)
Asia	661	95.0	803	92.6	925	86.0
China	51	7.3	84	9.7	150	14.0
Korea(N & S)	604	86.6	678	78.2	688	64.0
South America	1	0.1	4	0.5	71	6.6
Brazil	1	0.1	2	0.2	56	5.2
Peru	0	0.0	1	0.1	10	0.9
North America	22	3.2	34	3.9	45	4.2
Europe	11	1.6	21	2.4	26	2.4
Oceania	1	0.1	3	0.3	5	0.5
Africa	0	0.0	1	0.1	2	0.2
Stateless	1	0.1	1	0.1	1	0.1
Total	696	100.0	867	100.0	1,075	100.0

Source: Various editions of "Statistics on Registered Foreigner Residents in Japan" Ministy of Justice, Japan Immigration Association.

Korea (5,534), Malaysia (4,465), Thai (1,450), the Philippines (4,042), Bangladesh (5,925) and Pakistan (3,886). Iranians also contributed a large number of illegal migrant workers especially in 1991 (see Table 22).[28] Brazilians and Peruvians are also contributing significant numbers but are quite lucky because they are mostly Japanese emigrants and their descendents (Nikkeis) who are now automatically given work permits and permanent residency to work as unskilled laborers since

Table 22 Estimated Numbers of Illegal Migrants (Nov., 1991)

NATIONALITY		TOTAL	
TOTAL	216,399	Male	145,700
		Female	70,699
Thai	32,751	Male	13,780
		Female	18,971
South Korean	30,976	Male	20,469
		Female	10,507
Philippine	29,620	Male	13,850
		Female	15,770
Malaysian	25,379	Male	18,466
		Female	6,913
Iranian	21,719	Male	21,114
		Female	605
Chinese	21,649	Male	16,624
		Female	5,025
Pakistani	7,923	Male	7,786
		Female	137
Bangladeshi	7,807	Male	7,725
		Female	82
Taiwanese	5,897	Male	2,790
		Female	3,107
Burmese	3,425	Male	2,712
		Female	713
Sri Lankan	2,837	Male	2,618
		Female	219
Others	26,416	Male	17,766
		Female	8,650

Source: Immigration Office

the Japanese government revised its Immigration Law in June 1990. About 60,000 Nikkeis were working in Japan before the enactment of this law and 50,000 are thought to have entered the country in the last six months of 1990. Today, at least 150,000 Nikkeis are living and working in Japan. Nearly 80 per cent are Brazilians, 10 per cent are Peruvians, and the rest are mostly Bolivians or Argentinians.

Table 23 Foreigners Prosecuted for Working Illegally in Japan

Country of Origin	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991 (Jan-Jun)
Korea(South)	119	208	1,033	3,129	5,534	4,221
Iran	0	0	0	15	652	2,225
Philippines	6,297	8,027	5,386	3,740	4,042	1,426
Malaysia	0	18	279	1,865	4,465	1,290
Thailand	990	1,067	1,388	1,144	1,450	1,284
China			7	39	481	464
Taiwan			492	531	639	242
Hong Kong			3	18	22	12
(total of three)	356	494				
Pakistan	196	905	2,497	3,170	3,886	386
Bangladesh	58	438	2,942	2,277	5,925	122
Sri Lanka	0	0	20	90	831	114
Others	115	150	267	590	1,957	479
Total	8,131	11,307	14,314	16,608	29,884	12,265

Source: *Kokusai Jinryu.* no. 56, Jan., 1992, Japan Immigration Association.

5. CONCLUSION.

In this analysis, precisely because the sending emigrant countries have had large-scale of direct foreign investment and significant economic growth, the traditional migration push factors seem inadequate to explain the emigration which was directed at areas with a much lower overall growth rates. From the case of the United States, the overall levels of entries for Asian and Caribbean Basin immigrants continued to grow in the 1970s, a decade when unemployment was particularly high and during the same period the main immigrant sending countries had growth rates of about 5 to 9 per cent in GDP and even higher in manufacturing. Here the point is that direct foreign investment has been the main pillar in the close relationship between such high growth rates and large emigration.

In brief, I have explained that the expansion of modern forms of production have had a strong impact in the formation of a pool of migrant labor. Both export agriculture and export manufacturing have mobilized large numbers of people into wage labor. The large-scale development of commercial agriculture in Latin

America and the Caribbean contributed to the creation of a rural wage-labor supply through the displacement of subsistence farmers and small producers. This displacement created both a supply of rural wage laborers and large-scale migrations to the cities, and in some of these countries the migrations became international.

On the other hand, because it is highly labor intensive, the large-scale development of export-oriented manufacturing in South East Asia and the Caribbean Basin, including Mexico, could conceivably have contributed to relieve the unemployment problem, particularly among prime-aged males. Instead, it has drawn new segments of the population into the labor force mostly young women and left males unemployed. This factor has contributed to male emigration. At the same time, the high preference for only young women has contributed to growing unemployment among women. These women are laid off and westernized (or japanized), have a minimum possibility of returning to their communities of origin but emigrate. In sum, this sector has also come to play the role in the uprooting of people, stimulated male and female unemployment and resulting in labor migrations.

What is important for this analysis is that the introduction of modern forms of production, in emigrant countries through the development of foreign direct investment, has a dissolution effect on traditional waged and unwaged work structures. This fact contributes to the formation of a pool of potential emigrants and minimizes the possibilities of their returning to their areas of origin and, at the same time the emergence of emigration.

Footnotes.

1) This paper refers only to 'free migration' taken by individual choice.

2) especially illegal migrants (illegal foreign workers). The Ministry of Labor estimated that there were 210,000 migrants working illegally in Japan as of November, 1991. The problem of migrant workers has been becoming a serious problem because the Japanese government has been practising 'the close door policy' toward unskilled labour for the purpose of protecting the domestic labor market.

3) Saskia Sassen, 1988. *The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow*, Cambridge University Press.

4) Latin America, here in this paper, refer to the Caribbean Basin, South America, and Central America. It includes the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti, Peru, Brazil, and Mexico.

Asia, here in this paper, refer to South-East Asia. It includes South Korea, the Philippines, China, India, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

5) Brian M. Du Toit, 1973. Introduction : *Migration and Population Mobility*, in International, Congress of Antropology and Ecological Sciences, 9th, Chicago, p. 1

6) Hans and Javed, 1982. *International Labour Movements*, in Rich and Poor Countries, George Allen & Unwin (p) Ltd., p. 217.

7) Saskia Sassen, (1988), op. cit., p. 5.

8) ibid., p. 5.

9) ibid., p. 17.

10) ibid., p. 18.

11) ILO (International Labour Organization), ILO Information Bulletin, Vol. 19, No. 3, August 1983, p. 2.

12) ILO, Information Bulletin, Vol. 20,No. 5, November 1984, p. 1.

13) "exploitation of women workers are also marked by long hours and harsh working condition, physical and sexual abuse ..." (Mainichi Daily Shimbun, November 4, 1993).

Low wages (especially in electronic) are often justified as a trade-off for good special bonuses for high output, or benefits in the form of subsidised canteens, company buses and recreational activities. (ILO Information Bulletin, Vol. 20, op. cit., p. 1).

14) The evidence pointing to the harmful effects of semiconductor work on eyesight is overwhelming. After several years it deteriorates to the extent that the workers cannot continue. A Korean survey of the effects of microscope work found that about 47 per cent of the operatives were near-sighted and 19 per cent had astigmatism, although they had had 20-20 vision when they were hired, only a few years previously. Female microchip workers are also exposed to suspected carcinogens that could continue to harm their health over the coming decades, while some of he chemicals used may impair their reproduction systems which, in turn, may affect the health of their children. ibid., p. 1 & 7.

15) Saskia, op. cit., p. 19.

16) ibid., p. 2.

17) see Brinley Thomas, Book Reviews, in The Journal of Economic History, 1989, Vol. 49, Number 1.

18) OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), 1984, *External Debt of Developing Countries.* 1983 Survey, p. 14.

19) ibid., p. 20.

20) OECD, 1978, *Investing in Developing Countries*, p. 114.

21) OECD, 1989, *International Direct Investment and the New Economic environment, The Tokyo Round Table*, p. 39.

22) ibid., p. 40.

23) OECD, 1990, *Foreign Direct Investment and Industrial Development in Mexico*, p. 15.

24) OECD, 1989, op. cit., p. 52.

25) According to Warren and Kraly (1985), immigration into the United States has been divided by historians into five periods : the colonial period from 1609-1775, the open door period from 1776-1881, the regulation period from 1882-1916, the restriction period from 1917-1964, and the liberalization period from 1965 to the present.

26) if we include Miami City as another main cities to become six cities, together these cities amount for 42 per cent of legal immigration during 1987. Cubans accounted for 59 per cent of immigrants in Miami, followed by Haitians (9 per cent), Jamaicans (5 per cent), Colombian (5 per cent) and Dominicans (2 per cent). Since Cubans immigrants mostly adjusted former refugees, it is not mentioned in this paper, which discuss only voluntary (free) migration.

27) This is nothing more than the reason. The real truth behind this policy, more than anything else, is that it was a law to control the Koreans and Chinese residents which included in the routine "roundup's" after World War Two. For more detailed, see Yasuaki Ohnuma, *Tan-its Minzoku Shinwa o Koete* (Beyond the Myth of Homogeneous), Toshindo, Tokyo, 1986 and Kiyokatsu Nishiguchi *Nihon ni okeru Gaikokujin Roudosha* (Foreign Workers in Japan) in *Ajia no Keizai Hatten to Kaihatsu Keizai Gaku*, Horitsu Bunkasya, 1993.

28) In Immigration Department figures for foreign workers, Iranians numbered 0 in 1988, 15 in 1989, 652 in 1990 and 2,225 in the first half of 1991. In 1991, the Narita (Airport) Branch of the Immigration Office refused entry to 27,029 foreigners, and 27 per cent of them were Iranian.

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